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Abstract 
Sub-Saharan Africa continues to fall behind other developing regions regarding 
educational attainment, despite recent progress in enrollment. This thesis examines a 
variety of external conditional factors that could contribute to a country’s relative 
success, in terms of years spent in school using a prediction model that compares years 
enrolled in secondary education as a foundation to determine over- and under-performing 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
By exploring various educational policies, historical patterns, and projects 
executed in Rwanda, South Africa, Ghana, and Botswana, this thesis sheds light on four 
main challenges that can impact educational attainment: ethnic and racial tensions, an 
acute shortage of learning materials and trained teachers, inappropriate curricula, and 
high costs of education. Some of these challenges have been met with an array of 
policies, with mixed results in terms of the soundness and fairness of policies as well as 
the effectiveness of implementation.  
This thesis argues that to facilitate the creation of an effective school system, 
education policies must focus on more appropriate reallocations of funding, improved 
teacher-training quality throughout rural regions, applicable and localized curricula, 
conditional cash transfer programs, and long-term improvements in the job market.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The Importance of Education 
 
  
                    Nelson Mandela 
 
As both a fundamental human right and an engine for growth, education is a key 
tool for enhancing sustainable development throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Despite 
unprecedented economic advancement, the region lags in educational success. Various 
educational initiatives have struck the continent without resounding results: there has 
been a ten percent increase in out-of-school children over the past 15 years and one in 
four people in developing countries is completely illiterate (UNESCO 2015; Provost 
2014). Thus, policymakers are challenged with the task of identifying and implementing 
alternative approaches to improve not only access to, but the quality of education for all 
citizens.  
To identify effective policies for improved education systems, this thesis controls 
for a variety of external conditioning factors that likely contribute to secondary education 
achievement. This regression provides a platform to then analyze various educational 
policies, historical tactics, and projects executed previously in developing countries and 
encourage the adoption of effective education reform, otherwise known as the policy 
transfer approach.1 More specifically, this thesis will examine the educational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  “policy	  transfer”	  approach	  involves	  applying	  policy	  solutions	  in	  one	  political	  setting	  to	  administrations	  elsewhere.	  As	  recognized	  by	  Wolman	  (1992,	  43-­‐44),	  policy	  transfer	  is	  not	  “an	  isolated	  endeavor,”	  but	  rather	  an	  “integral	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  process.”	  In	  a	  later	  report	  (2006),	  Wolman	  specifies	  three	  critical	  questions	  to	  analyze	  when	  considering	  the	  transfer	  policy	  approach:	  1)	  Are	  the	  issues	  in	  the	  
“Education is the most powerful weapon 
which you can use to change the world” 
2	  	  
	  	  
frameworks in Rwanda, South Africa, Ghana, and Botswana that contribute to the 
country’s relative success or failures in terms of educational attainment.   
The following section will outline some challenges barring students from 
educational achievement and the benefits of education for those students, to explain why 
expanding access to quality education has become a major policy goal in the last half 
century. The second chapter presents a regression model developed to determine which 
countries’ populations are over- or under-performing in regards to the number of years of 
education attained. Selecting countries from the regression model in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 
presents Rwanda, South Africa, Ghana, and Botswana as case studies to analyze 
opportunities and policies in sub-Saharan Africa’s education reform. Given the analysis 
of these individual cases, Chapter 4 offers insights for reform in the future to ensure that 
education can serve as basic insurance against poverty.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  recipient	  country	  similar	  to	  the	  originating	  country?	  2)	  In	  what	  scope	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  policies	  on	  the	  challenges	  in	  the	  originating	  country	  and	  what	  was	  the	  “value-­‐added”	  of	  the	  program?	  3)	  How	  does	  the	  recipient	  country	  differ	  from	  the	  originating	  country?	  Will	  policies	  still	  be	  susceptible?	  (Wolman	  2006,	  17).	  Widespread	  policy	  transfer	  approaches	  have	  been	  adopted	  in	  situations	  such	  as	  privatizing	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (Kikeri	  et	  al.	  1994),	  addressing	  money	  laundering	  in	  170	  countries	  (Sharman	  2008),	  and	  in	  establishing	  central	  banks	  as	  legally	  independent	  (Marcussen	  2005,	  903).	  While	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  helpful	  in	  development,	  it	  can	  also	  prove	  dangerous	  when	  policies	  are	  applied	  without	  appropriate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  specific	  country	  context.	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Challenges for Schools and Students 
 Sub-Saharan Africa continues to face complex barriers that impede improvement 
of a stronger educational infrastructure, ranging from inadequate learning material and 
infrastructural decay to overcrowded classrooms. At the school level, ensuring adequate 
access, quality and relevance may be costly and inefficient. On the bureaucratic level, 
governance and financing have been slow and, in many cases, corrupt. Therefore, despite 
policies directed to benefit the poor and investments in resources, access to education 
remains strongly associated with household wealth; children from the poorest households 
in sub-Saharan Africa are approximately three times more likely to be out of school than 
their economically advantaged counterparts (Deininger, 2003). This is due to an 
unusually perfect storm of factors: an inability to meet the cost of education, high 
opportunity cost of losing child labor in subsistence-oriented rural communities, and the 
distance travelled to school. 
 Targeted discrimination further exacerbates both the causes and consequences of 
the disparities in sub-Saharan Africa. Marginalized groups such as disabled students are 
denied education because of a lack of access, specialist facilities, and cultural stigmas. 
Young women face cultural norms such as early marriage, teenage pregnancy, gender-
based violence, and discriminatory education laws and practices that prevent millions of 
them from the opportunity to benefit from education (Ombati and Mokua 2012).  
Additionally, environmental shocks, such as droughts and other natural disasters, 
can significantly damage education attainment. Since girls in sub-Saharan Africa 
typically spend approximately 15 hours of their week obtaining water for their families 
4	  	  
	  	  
(Human Development Report 2006, 22), spending time in a classroom may appear an 
unnecessary privilege.2  
Challenges that stymy sub-Saharan Africa’s educational development cannot be 
divorced from the impeding ramifications of ethnicity. If a government is hijacked by one 
or more ethnic groups, state machinery can be manipulated to ensure “upward social 
mobility…whereby clientelism and nepotism are used as yardsticks in the acquisition of 
state contracts and tenders” (Noyoo 2000, 59). In regards to education, ethnic differences 
can lead to discriminatory practices or curricula that can impede learning for certain 
groups. For instance, Rwandan education has continued to benefit the ruling party, 
currently the Tutsis, and has been inimical for the rural majority, the Hutu.  
These cultural tensions can manifest into conflict, another factor that proves 
detrimental to education systems. In 2008, it was estimated that over half of the world’s 
out-of-school children live in conflict-affected states (Nicolai 2008, 27). On average, in 
conflict-riddled areas, 79 percent of young people are literate, compared with the 93 
percent of young people in non-affected poor countries around the world (UNESCO 
2011, 132). This disparity is a result of the fact that in-country conflict can physically 
damage school buildings and often increases the orphaned population—affecting the 
entire apparatus of an educational structure and hindering the cultural views towards 
school (Abdi 1998). Families in Nigeria, for example, were strongly discouraged from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Maslow’s	  Hierarchy	  of	  Needs	  is	  a	  five	  stage	  model	  that	  explains	  motivational	  needs.	  One	  must	  first	  satisfy	  lower	  level	  “basic”	  needs	  before	  progressing	  to	  “self-­‐actualization”	  (Maslow	  1943,	  370).	  The	  order	  of	  needs	  follows,	  in	  order	  of	  deficiency	  needs	  to	  growth	  needs:	  1.	  Biological	  and	  Physiological	  needs	  such	  as	  food,	  water,	  shelter;	  2.	  Safety	  needs,	  such	  as	  protection	  from	  elements,	  law,	  stability;	  3.	  Social	  needs	  such	  as	  family	  and	  romantic	  relationships;	  4.	  Esteem	  needs,	  such	  as	  
5	  	  
	  	  
sending their children to school for months after Boko Haram kidnapped 234 girls taking 
Physics exams in April of 2014 (Times Live 2014). In Mali, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Somalia, violent insurgents destroyed schools and left the education system 
bereft of teaching professionals and adequate infrastructure (Poirier 2012).  
Benefits of Education 
In sub-Saharan Africa, abject poverty, corrupt governance, and wanton violence 
are often endemic, distracting governments from seriously devoting effort to 
comprehensive education reform. However, these multi-faceted countrywide challenges 
can be mitigated through education, and the severe challenges posed in improving the 
education sector are often outweighed by its benefits.  
Economically, education is generally understood to be a vital catalyst for fostering 
sustainable economic development on both the individual and societal level of a country 
(Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007; Hanushek and Woessmann 2007). Indeed, the “rate of 
return to investment on education,” which compares the cost of attending school to the 
benefits of having more education for individuals, is found to yield the highest results for 
the poorest populations (Psacharopoulous and Patrinos 2004, 15). One study by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute found that when women farmers in Kenya 
are given the same level of education as their male counterparts, farms yield up to 22 
percent more crops (Davis et al. 2012). A 2011 UNESCO report found that one extra year 
of schooling relates to an estimated ten percent increase in an individual’s earnings. 
6	  	  
	  	  
However, some argue that the relationship between education and private income may 
not necessarily be as strong as simple correlations imply.3  
Education can also improve the overall welfare of a country. Theodore Schultz’s 
“Human Capital Theory” analyzes human-focused investment as a means to enhance 
welfare, since gap in earnings reflect differences in a country’s health and education 
system (Schultz 1961, 4). According to this theory, expenditure on education is an 
investment similar to any other, with a broad range of returns that make the investment 
profitable. The concept of education improving overall national output through 
productivity and intellectual flexibility in the workforce is seen on a global level, 
especially in cases like the East Asian Miracle, and can be found in sub-Saharan Africa as 
well (Romer 1990).4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Determining	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  development	  is	  difficult	  given	  the	  unreliable	  evidence	  of	  micro	  and	  macroeconomic	  data.	  The	  micro-­‐level	  impact	  of	  education	  is	  challenging	  to	  measure,	  given	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  earnings	  does	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  an	  individual’s	  gains	  in	  productivity,	  but	  instead	  may	  be	  reflecting	  more	  of	  an	  innate	  characteristic	  of	  determination	  that	  could	  justify	  the	  higher	  income	  (Psacharopoulos	  1994,	  1328).	  Temple	  (2001,	  24)	  asserts	  that	  externalities	  of	  education	  can	  imply	  an	  increase	  in	  productivity	  that	  is	  not	  shown	  in	  the	  individual’s	  private	  wages.	  Furthermore,	  others	  argue	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  education	  on	  wage	  depends	  on	  the	  general	  supply	  of	  skilled	  labor	  and	  the	  demand	  of	  human	  capital,	  and	  often	  assuming	  that	  the	  returns	  on	  human	  capital	  are	  constant	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  incorrect	  (Schultz	  1961,	  73).	  4	  A	  common	  example	  of	  impressive	  economic	  growth	  paralleling	  education	  reform	  is	  found	  in	  East	  Asia.	  Sixty	  years	  ago,	  South	  Korea	  was	  impoverished;	  today,	  it	  is	  the	  11th	  largest	  global	  economy	  and	  boasts	  one	  of	  the	  best	  education	  systems	  in	  the	  world	  (Chakrabarti	  2013).	  Singapore,	  a	  small	  city-­‐state	  with	  few	  resources	  in	  1960,	  now	  trails	  closely	  behind	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Japan	  in	  educational	  attainment	  as	  well	  as	  overall	  economic	  productivity.	  A	  1993	  World	  Bank	  report	  studied	  eight	  East	  Asian	  economies	  accrediting	  their	  success	  to	  “getting	  the	  basics	  right,”	  including	  establishing	  a	  sound	  development	  policy,	  encouraging	  productive	  agricultural	  policies,	  and	  focusing	  on	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools	  in	  education	  policies	  (Birdsall	  et	  al.	  1993,	  5).	  High	  rates	  of	  investments	  between	  1960	  and	  1990	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  human	  capital	  due	  to	  universal	  primary	  and	  
7	  	  
	  	  
For example, one report predicted 171 million people, or 12 percent of the world 
poverty population, could be lifted out of poverty if all students in low-income countries 
left school with basic reading skills (UNESCO 2011). In sub-Saharan Africa, as reported 
by the World Bank, each overall additional year of schooling raises annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) by 0.37 percent, while an increase of one standard deviation in 
student scores on international assessments of literacy and numeracy is associated with a 
two percent increase in annual GDP (Education Counts Towards the Millennium 
Development Goals 2011, 32).  
Substantial evidence further reinforces the idea that broadly based human capital 
investment is an integral component of rapid and sustainable growth, which also acts as a 
tool to guarantee an overall healthier life. Education is directly associated with lower 
levels of child mortality:	  in sub-Saharan Africa, each year of a mother’s schooling 
reduces the probability of infant mortality by five to ten percent (UNESCO 2011). 
Moreover, the 2011 UNESCO report predicted that an estimated 1.8 million children’s 
lives in sub-Saharan Africa could have been saved in 2008 if their mothers had at least 
secondary education.  
Additionally, education proves to be deeply intertwined with the pervasive role of 
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa: the disease has proven to further hinder the teacher 
shortage in sub-Saharan Africa while improved education can reduce the rate at which it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  secondary	  education	  (Birdsall	  et	  al.1993,	  8,	  15).	  Children	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  Korea,	  and	  Singapore	  received	  universal	  primary	  education	  by	  1965	  and	  secondary	  by	  1987,	  successfully	  expediting	  the	  elimination	  of	  gender	  gaps	  in	  education	  (Birdsall	  et	  al.1993,	  43).	  The	  report,	  in	  stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  human	  capital,	  credits	  investment	  in	  people,	  education,	  and	  health	  to	  East	  Asia’s	  success	  economically	  and	  in	  social	  stability,	  as	  paired	  with	  economic	  policy	  changes	  in	  these	  different	  markets	  (Birdsall	  et	  al.1993,	  19).	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spreads. In South Africa, approximately one out of five teachers aged 25 to 34 is living 
with the HIV/AIDS; in Tanzania, over 45,000 teachers have already been lost to the 
epidemic (Pennap et al. 2011). In contrast, education can drastically reduce the incidence 
of these diseases; one example of this was in Ethiopia, where community based health 
workers diagnosed and treated patients free of charge and halved malaria deaths over 
three years (World Health Organization 2010). Educating girls and women, in particular, 
is shown to be an incredibly effective investment in developing countries, leading to 
better family health, improved birth spacing, lower infant and child mortality, and 
enhanced educational attainment of their children (Ozturk 2001, 2). Alongside 
HIV/AIDS, education combats malaria and similar life-threatening diseases by dispelling 
stigmas and discrimination through awareness, as well as by improving access to 
treatment. 
As these case studies make clear, there are tremendous benefits of education, yet 
the challenges to realizing them must be acknowledged and overcome. The following 
section develops a regression model to understand the significance that different factors 
can play in realizing educational attainment. This thesis then uses that prediction model 
as a basis for analyzing four country case studies.   
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Chapter 2: Developing a Foundation for Comparison 
Plans to prioritize education, most notably through the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals, have galvanized unprecedented efforts to provide 
universal primary education by 2015.5 While the Education Goal has not been fully 
achieved, the developing world has witnessed an impressive surge in global gross 
primary school enrollment rates, while an acknowledgment of the need for basic 
education has become universally paramount. Indeed, as exhibited in Table 1, sub-
Saharan Africa observed the largest increases in the primary adjusted net enrollment 
ratio, from 59 percent in 1999 to 79 percent in 2012 (UNESCO Institute of Statistics 
Database).  
Secondary education, however, has not followed the same trajectory, and while 
the global convergence around primary education enrollment is certainly impressive, 
secondary education has been relatively neglected, and sub-Saharan Africa still lags far 
behind the rest of the world, as seen in Table 2. Interestingly, sub-Saharan Africa’s gross 
enrollment by 2012 (20 percent) has kept pace with Low Income Countries (19 percent 
enrollment in 2012), while other low-income regions have seen a larger surge in growth 
over these past thirteen years, validating that sub-Saharan Africa suffers from the slowest 
growth in the world and? regionally in terms of enrollment rates. Meanwhile, high-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  eight	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  were	  established	  in	  2000,	  following	  the	  Millennium	  Summit	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  to	  prioritize	  sustainable	  development	  globally.	  	  Around	  the	  world,	  189	  member	  states	  committed	  to:	  1)	  eradicate	  extreme	  poverty	  2)	  achieve	  universal	  primary	  education	  3)	  promote	  gender	  equality	  4)	  reduce	  child	  mortality	  5)	  improve	  maternal	  health	  6)	  combat	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  other	  diseases	  7)	  ensure	  environmental	  sustainability	  and	  8)	  develop	  global	  partnerships	  for	  development	  by	  2015	  (Sustainable	  Development	  Goals).	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income countries had a greater percentage increase from a higher starting base (72 to 86 
percent) (Bruneforth et al. 2011). Similarly, only 56 percent of children finish primary 
school education and, according to UNESCO, 69 million secondary school-age children 
do not attend secondary school (Bruneforth et al. 2011).6  
The increase in primary enrollment rates is laudable, and a rising number of 
children are able to enroll in secondary education, but overall retention is remarkably 
low. At its current trajectory, lower-secondary completion in sub-Saharan Africa is not 
expected to reach 100 percent for another hundred years (Winthrop 2015); of the 128 
million students graduating from primary school, only half will acquire basic literacy and 
math skills to live productive lives (Van Fleet 2012). This reality potentially reflects poor 
quality at the primary level that halts students from succeeding past the compulsory 
primary education. Secondary school student retention rate is one indicator of the quality 
of primary education provided. Secondary education is a pivotal developmental stage that 
encourages for fostering transferrable skills to create an active, educated citizenship, and 
is an essential for crossing the bridge into university. Secondary school and university 
education, in turn, is crucial for training primary school teachers.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  UNESCO	  defines	  secondary	  school-­‐age	  children	  as	  ranging	  from	  ten	  to	  16	  years	  of	  age	  (2015).	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Table 1: Trends in Enrollment in Sub-Saharan Africa by Education Level 1970 to 2008 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Number of Students by Level (in thousands) 
Pre-Primary … … … … 4,258 4,926 6,626 9,012 10,902 
Primary 23,473 31,048 4,6337 55,498 59,562 70,451 86,757 112,156 128,548 
Secondary 4,260 5,734 8,883 13,588 14,888 18,400 22,015 30,986 36,349 
Tertiary 202 307 557 894 1,288 1,830 2,484 3,813 41,517 
 
Gross Enrollment Rate 
  
Pre-Primary … … … … 10.5 10.6 12.1 14.8 16.7 
Primary 52.5 60.6 77.6 79.3 72.8 75.8 82.2 95.4 101.6 
Secondary 11.3 13.2 17.8 23.3 22.5 23.9 25 31 34.1 
Tertiary 0.8 1.1 1.7 2.4 3 3.6 4.2 5.5 6.1 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics Database 
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Table 2: Secondary Enrollment Rates in 1999 and 2012 
 Total Enrollment 
change since 1999 - 
2012 (%) 
Gross Enrollment 
Ratio 1999 (%) 
Gross Enrollment 
Ratio 2012 (%) 
Gender Parity 
Index of GER 
1999 (F/M) 
Gender Parity 
Index of GER 
2012 (F/M) 
World 64 33 54 0.97 1 
Low Income 
Countries 107 11 19 0.99 0.97 
High Income 
Countries 22 72 86 0.98 0.99 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 149 11 20 0.96 1 
East Asia / Pacific 45 38 68 0.98 0.9 
South and West 
Asia 148 22 55 0.94 1.02 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 34 54 74 1.01 1 
North America 
and Western 
Europe 
20 76 89 0.98 0.98 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 29 51 74 0.96 0.98 
Arab States 83 15 25 0.79 0.98 
Central Asia 48 19 33 0.95 1 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics Database 2016. 
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The Basis for Analysis 
While secondary level schooling is considered compulsory in developed 
countries, it is a scarce luxury in much of the world. UNESCO’s International Institute 
for Educational Planning investigated the characteristics of secondary schooling in 
developing countries, ascertaining that the majority of them will face acute problems in 
financing secondary education expansion given the present conditions and cost structures 
(Lewin and Caillods 2001, 58). The problem is twofold: first, countries with low 
educational attainment rates at the secondary level are unable to finance substantially 
higher rates of participation given the current cost structure; second, the high cost and 
poor quality of primary and secondary education is precluding students from initial 
enrollment and retention in school.  
In sub-Saharan Africa, growth in enrollment rates for secondary schools has 
occurred in the past half-century, with Nigeria accounting for the largest increase: the 
country’s 6 million secondary students eclipsed the 400,000 enrolled in 1970. Despite 
this growth, sub-Saharan countries still have the world’s lowest secondary school 
participation and the supply of quality post-primary education and vocational training is 
not nearly enough to match the swelling demand (Provost 2014). Low enrollment rates 
are not always an issue of whether households prioritize education, but rather an issue of 
feasibility, accessibility, and quality. Choosing appropriate curricula to offer during and 
after primary school is a growing matter of concern, and will only become more critical 
as the initiatives and policies to encourage participation at the primary level start to bear 
fruit.  
14	  	  
	  	  
The quantitative expansion of primary or secondary education enrollment rates in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is an important metric of education progress. As one might expect, 
countries with low enrollment rates at the primary level are expected to have lower 
enrollment rates at the secondary level, implying an overall failure of the system for its 
students. The students who do enroll in secondary education may not be able to stay in 
school because they have not been adequately equipped from primary. Enrollment gives a 
general idea of a school system’s overall quality; even more telling, though, is the 
number of years spent in school. Geographic and economic disparities push many 
children, who would otherwise be able to enroll, out of the education system after a short 
period of time (Ombati and Mokua 2012). The combination of grade repetition, dropout 
rates, and poor teacher quality certainly halts the universal education Millennium 
Development Goals, but salvaging this mission requires a deeper understanding and 
suitable revamping of local policies—as well as region-specific knowledge, which will 
shed more light on the challenges that hinder educational achievement. This thesis will 
focus on Ghana, Botswana, Rwanda, and South Africa in order to identify challenges 
representative of broader trends in the region. These case studies will offer insight into 
the complexities of educational success that mere educational attainment may not show.  
The limited number of years spent in school can be worsened by other bottlenecks 
in countries’ education systems, primarily the costs of education. An increase of actual 
costs of basics such as tuition fees and school uniforms compounds with the opportunity 
costs of being away from household chores and employment. Because international aid 
has so heavily focused on primary education, the average cost of secondary education in 
sub-Saharan Africa is about 40 percent of individual spending (Provost 2014). 
15	  	  
	  	  
Additionally, students often are expected to pass a national exam before attending 
secondary school, causing low admission rates if the primary education does not prepare 
students for the test. It is partially due to low levels of retention at the primary level, that 
approximately two thirds of sub-Saharan African children are essentially barred from 
secondary school completely (Provost 2014). Private schools have emerged as an 
alternative option for education; however, these private schools are exclusive, often more 
expensive, and frequently not better.  
While there are many indicators of the quality of a school system—from grade 
repetition, test scores, teacher quality, dropout rates, etc.—one of the simplest measures 
of the quality of a school system is a country’s average number of years a student spends 
in school. If a school system is accessible, affordable, and beneficial, students are 
expected stay in the system for a longer period of time. Therefore, a highly effective 
system will reflect a longer duration of students staying in school than an ineffective one. 
Because of this, the number of a years a typical student spends in school is a metric of the 
quality of the overall school system. 
To be clear, this metric is likely more useful in developing education systems than 
it is in more developed systems where there is a higher rate of retention. In countries like 
Norway or Korea where most students attend college, other metrics like test score, 
teacher quality, or dropout rates may be better metrics of overall performance—and these 
metrics are more widely available in developed countries. In developing countries, where 
the opportunity cost to staying inside the classroom is higher, years of sustained 
enrollment in school is both readily available and an indicator—albeit somewhat 
problematic—of total school quality. 
16	  	  
	  	  
Identifying Key Conditioning Factors 
If primary school adequately prepares students for the next phase of the education 
cycle, students are less likely to drop out of school and more likely to progress to 
secondary school and stay enrolled—especially if the students and their families believe 
that more schooling will be effective at creating future opportunities for the student. In 
order to realize the strong economic return of investing in education, policymakers face 
two challenges: they must make schools accessible and effective for students.  However, 
there are a variety of external variables that can detract from the overall implementation 
and effectiveness of educational achievement. In an attempt to lessen the relevance of 
some confounding effects of educational success, this thesis uses a regression analysis to 
control for these variables: 
1. Average per capita income 
2. The percent of rural population 
3. The rate of intentional homicide 
By controlling for each country’s inputs in the regression on average years of 
secondary school attended, this study can deduce policies that impact a nation’s 
educational success. The paragraphs below address each of these control variables in turn 
and explain why some variables are excluded from the regression model.  
Chapter 1 emphasizes the mutually beneficial relationship between education and 
a country’s economic strength. Education is widely considered fundamental to 
development, and poor educational infrastructure represents both a cause and a 
manifestation of poverty. Sufficient education requires proper infrastructure, teacher-
training, and sustained high costs. As education is largely financed by the government, 
the stronger a country’s economy, the more resources it has to improve its education 
17	  	  
	  	  
system. In sub-Saharan Africa, distributing the share of domestically generated revenue is 
a challenging trade-off among increasing public spending, taxes, and debt sustainability 
(Bruneforth et al. 2011, 19). Thus a country’s economic strength, determined by average 
per capita income, will positively impact its educational attainment at all levels of 
schooling, and must be controlled for in determining the impact and efficacy of education 
policy. 
Moreover, rural students tend to underperform when compared to their urban 
counterparts (Zhang 2006, 583). It seems appropriate to assume a woman who has grown 
up in an urban area is more likely to have received more primary education than a woman 
in a rural area, and will consequently stay in school longer. Additionally, there are less 
domestic pressures encouraging an urban student to leave school. Rural children are 
faced with the task of domestic chores and agricultural work, which may appear more 
economically beneficial for the household in the short term. One study analyzing 
education in Zimbabwe found that controlling for urbanization had the most pronounced 
impact on educational attainment (Kravdal 2002). The urban-rural balance among sub-
Saharan countries can control for populations that are particularly vulnerable to 
educational disadvantage and, therefore, this disparity must be controlled for when 
analyzing sensible education policy.  
Lastly, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have suffered catastrophic 
massacres rooted in entrenched ethnic tensions and refugee crises. Attacks on schools, 
human rights violations, and diversions of resources to military spending explain how 
this regional volatility destroys educational opportunity for children in conflict zones. 
Moreover, the effects of loss, injury, insecurity, psychological trauma, dislocation of 
18	  	  
	  	  
family and community life, and displacement are difficult to measure, but irrefutably 
deprive entire populations of maximizing their development. 
A 2011 UNESCO Education for All (EFA) report found that children in conflict-
affected areas are 30 percent less likely to enroll in secondary school than in regions 
without substantial conflict (UNESCO 2011, 133).  It also found that literacy levels for 
young people are drastically smaller than in other countries, at 79 percent and 93 percent 
respectively, which exacerbates the gender parity (UNESCO 2011, 133). Moreover, the 
average mortality rate for children under five in these conflict-ridden areas is more than 
double the rate in other countries. Identifying conflict-afflicted countries is difficult, 
given the myriad forms of violence that expand past the standard definition of warfare; 
however, the heavy burden that violent conflict extracts on education means it must be 
controlled for when analyzing education policy. Therefore, this thesis will control for the 
estimated rate of homicide rather than implementing a binary war/non-war variable.  
Institutional strength, stability, and credibility also influence education policy. 
Ordinarily, more stable governments are better able to provide the foundation of 
education and development, while corrupt institutions may not direct funds in the best 
interest of its people. However, as institutional reliability is reflective of a government’s 
efforts, priorities, and structures, it would be inconsistent to control for this factor in the 
regression model for educational attainment. Additionally, economic strength alone 
cannot account for the overall success in educational attainment. As shown in Table 3, 
sub-Saharan African spending on education has increased by more than six percent 
annually—twice that in Mozambique and Burundi (Bruneforth et al. 2011). Still, a total 
of 32 million children in the region remain out of school. Therefore, government 
19	  	  
	  	  
spending on education will be considered when analyzing each case study, but not 
included in the regression model.
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Table 3: Spending on Education as % of Total Spending in sub-Saharan Africa in 2011 
Country Population 
('000) 
Total Education 
spending as % of 
GDP 
Spending on 
Primary  (% of 
total spending) 
Spending on 
Secondary  (% 
of total 
spending) 
Spending on 
Tertiary  (%of 
total spending) 
Angola 18021 2.6 27.6 42.7 8.2 
Benin 8662 3.5 57.6 19 20 
Botswana 1921 7.9 19.2 31.3 43.5 
Burkina Faso 15234 4.6 65.7 12.2 11 
Burundi 8074 8.3 50.8 25.1 20 
Cameroon 19088 3.7 29.9 58.6 7.4 
Cape Verde 499 4.9 42.9 39 16.1 
CA Republic 4339 1.3 48.4 25.4 17.4 
Chad 10914 3.2 56.8 27.1 16.1 
Comoros 661 7.6 60.5 4.8 34.6 
Kenya 38765 6.7 54.7 22.8 15.7 
Lesotho 2049 12.4 35.7 20.8 36.8 
Madagascar 19111 3 47.2 20.1 17.7 
Mali 12706 4.4 39.9 40.7 18.7 
Mauritius 1280 3.2 27.9 42.6 11.3 
Mozambique 22383 5 56.2 28.5 14.3 
Niger 14704 4.5 61.1 22 11.8 
Rwanda 9721 4.9 45.3 19.8 29.2 
Senegal 12211 5.8 45.5 27.4 26.9 
Sierra Leone 5560 4.3 49.9 32.6 17.5 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics Database 2016. 
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Analysis of the Regression Model 
 Using panel data to control for these key factors, this thesis will build an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) model for regression analysis. The control regression model will 
allow residuals analysis to be made to examine the differences between observed and 
expected traits predicted by a model.  
 To accomplish this, it is first necessary to identify the main factors impacting the 
average years of secondary education school and then analyze these variables. This 
model uses data from the World Bank Dataset and the Barro-Lee Educational Data from 
1960 to 2010and spans over 50 years.7 8   After performing various fixed effects 
regressions, the relationship between secondary education, per capita income, and rural 
populations showed strong statistical significance and correlation.  
If one were concerned about the impact of a given control variable, the model 
would have to test for multicollinearity. If two or more predictor variables are too highly 
correlated, they detract from the accuracy of the model. Generally, if the correlation 
matrix shows to be over 90 percent correlated, it should be ignored to avoid the adverse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  World	  Bank	  Dataset	  includes	  the	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  and	  International	  Debt	  Statistics.	  Both	  of	  these	  databases	  predominantly	  collect	  data	  that	  are	  either	  from	  current	  reports	  gathered	  by	  official	  sources	  or	  by	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  country	  management	  units.	  For	  consistency,	  this	  thesis	  relies	  specifically	  on	  the	  data	  obtained	  from	  official	  services.	  	  	  8	  The	  Barro-­‐Lee	  Educational	  Attainment	  Dataset	  is	  an	  estimated	  extrapolation	  of	  the	  census/survey	  observations	  on	  global	  attainment	  from	  data	  collected	  by	  UNESCO	  Institute	  for	  Statistics	  and	  UNDP	  Human	  Development	  Office.	  It	  is	  a	  panel	  dataset	  on	  education	  attainment	  that	  covers	  146	  countries	  from	  1950	  to	  2010	  that	  disaggregates	  by	  sex	  and	  by	  five-­‐year	  age	  intervals.	  Missing	  attainment	  data	  is	  estimated	  for	  15-­‐19	  and	  20-­‐24	  age	  groups.	  The	  dataset	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  Korea	  Research	  Foundation.	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impact of multicollinearity. In this model, as seen in Table 4, the coefficients are in line 
with empirical predictions and are not at risk of multicollinearity. In line with 
expectations, countries with higher per capita incomes are found to, on average, have 
lower percentages of their population be rural and lower homicide rates; the homicide 
rate shows a weaker correlation to per capita income. 
Table 4: Independent Variable Correlation Matrix 
 Rural Population Rate of Homicide Per Capita Income 
Rural Population 1.000 -- -- 
Rate of Homicide 0.0875 1.000 -- 
Per Capita Income -0.5280 -0.256 1.000 
 
While not succumbing to multicollinearity, this is not relevant for this thesis, 
which focuses only on creating a model that will demonstrate a country’s performance.  
This analysis first builds these fixed effects regression: 
𝑆𝐸𝑅!" =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑐𝑖!"!! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙!"!! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡!"!! + 𝜀!" 
Where SER is the average number of years a student is enrolled in secondary schooling 
in country i at time t, pci is the reported average per capita income and rural is the 
percent of the population of nation i living in rural areas at time t-1. 𝜀 is the deviation 𝑆𝐸𝑅!" from the mean value of the distribution for each country i at time t and 𝛽! is the 
intercept, which is insignificant for the purpose of this analysis. The results of this 
regression, for both the world and exclusively sub-Saharan Africa, are in Table 35 (see: 
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Appendix) and show statistically significant and relatively substantial coefficients for per 
capita income and the percent of rural populations. 
Table 5: Regression Output I 
Variables Average Years Enrolled in Secondary School 
Rural Population (%) -0.465*** 
 (0.0796) 
GDP Per Capita (USD) 0.00505*** 
 (0.000622) 
Rate of Homicide (%) -0.0119 
 (0.170) 
Constant 42.38*** 
 (7.532) 
 
R Squared Within 0.7412 
  
Observations 217 
Number of Countries 21 
Note: In order to control for time effects, this model used year dummies from 1960 to 
2010.   
Note: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1  
Note: the standard errors are in parentheses. 
  
These results imply that a one percent decrease in the percent of rural population 
is associated with a 0.465 unit increase in the years enrolled in secondary education at the 
99 percent confidence level. A $100 increase in GDP per capita is associated with a 0.5 
increase in years enrolled in secondary education at the 99 percent confidence level. Rate 
of homicide, this model’s measure of in-country conflict, is not statistically significant, 
but still shows that an increase in the rate of violence is associated with a decrease in 
educational attainment at the secondary education level.  The constant is 42.38. An 𝑅!of 
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0.7412 implies that approximately three-fourths of the variation in average total years of 
secondary education can be explained by this model.  
Using this regression to understand the influences of each variable, this study then 
created a prediction model to find and analyze the residuals for each country at each point 
in time. The prediction model is:  𝑆𝐸𝑅!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑐𝑖!"!! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙!"!! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡!"!! 
Determining 𝑆𝐸𝑅!"#!" as the difference in difference results of actual total years 
enrolled in secondary school and predicted years enrolled in secondary school indicates 
the relative over- or under-performance of each country. Because the prediction model 
for both the World and Sub-Saharan Africa converge (see Appendix: Table 35), this 
justifies analyzing only the Sub-Saharan Africa residuals, making the prediction model: 𝑆𝐸𝑅!"#!" = 𝑆𝐸𝑅!" − 𝑆𝐸𝑅!" 
Figure 1 shows the outcomes of the prediction model. The residual difference is 
the predicted amount of time spent in secondary school for each country in a given year, 
spanning 1960 to 2010. Thus, if a country is found to have a positive residual, the nation 
has a more effective secondary education policy than a country with a negative residual. 
For example, in Botswana in 2010, the average years of secondary schooling were 3.19, 
while the predicted amount of schooling in comparison to other countries in the region 
was approximately 2.43. The residual between the two is 0.76 years of schooling. 
Some countries stand out as particularly successful, e.g. Botswana, Ghana, 
Mauritius, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Others perform especially poorly, given their 
predicted secondary schooling, such as Mauritania, Mozambique, and Zambia. Therefore, 
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to examine relative successes and failures, this thesis selects a few “outliers” to examine 
educational policies, historical context, and various projects implemented: Rwanda, 
South Africa, Ghana, and Botswana.  
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Chapter 3: Case Study Analysis 
Rwanda, South Africa, Ghana, and Botswana were chosen to identify the diversity 
in educational achievement throughout the continent. Rwanda shows a downward trend 
in average years spent in secondary school, South Africa shows inconsistency, Ghana is 
moderately successful, and Botswana proves extraordinarily successful. While this 
regression is thorough, data cannot account for some more qualitative factors that impact 
educational attainment in countries. For instance, the percent of rural population does not 
fully account for the legacy of apartheid in South Africa, the “sons of the soil” mantra 
that was promoted in Rwanda until the genocide, or the rural discrimination and 
corruption common in Northern Ghana. The rate of intentional homicide does not 
account for the long-term ramifications of ethnic bias and racism on education. Per capita 
income does not fully encompass how education is spent, the quality of teachers or 
classrooms, or what the actual cost of education is for each country. Moreover, per capita 
income does not incorporate the evolving privatization of secondary schools and the 
quality of teachers. The regression simply permits the platform to identify useful case 
studies. The case study analysis is intended to offer substantial qualitative factors that can 
hinder secondary education attainment by drawing on common threads of education 
policy. These are challenges are: 
1. Prolonged ethnic and racial tensions that lead to disadvantaged populations 
2. An acute shortage of adequate learning materials and trained teachers 
3. Inappropriate or insufficient curricula, creating a disjunction between labor supply 
and demand 
4. High out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs of education 
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The following section will explore institutional policies and reforms that have 
contributed to educational productivity to find influences that can contribute to success 
regardless of context. Similarly, certain case studies that focused on under-performing 
educational systems will be analyzed to determine universally negative impacts on 
education.  After an in-depth analysis of each case, it will offer a set of policy 
recommendations considering these qualitative factors. Namely, the different African 
governments must address pro-poor education policies to incorporate the largely 
disadvantaged rural populations to assure education to be accessible, affordable, and 
equitable for all. 
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Case Study 1: Education in Rwanda 
 
As with virtually every aspect of Rwandan life, education policy in the country is 
decisively shaped by its horrific period of genocide in 1994.9 In the case of Rwanda, this 
involved extreme Hutu nationalists aiming to exterminate the ostensibly privileged Tutsi 
minority and Hutu moderates.10  For three months, a “kill or be killed” mentality infected 
the small country through a meticulously organized campaign of slaughter. The massacre 
slowly concluded with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) combatting violence with 
violence, killing thousands of Hutu civilians and arresting many more who demonstrated 
Hutu-power ideology (Human Rights Watch 1999).11  The RPF is a rebel army that 
consists primarily of Tutsi refugees who grew up in Uganda. Paul Kagame, now the 
president of Rwanda, led the RPF as they took control in the chaotic country, and began 
working to establish order.  
President Kagame, a Tutsi, has been internationally praised for his reforms, which 
sparked impressive economic growth following violence so profound and grief so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  International	  law	  defines	  genocide	  as	  “the	  intent	  to	  destroy,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  a	  national,	  ethnical,	  racial	  or	  religious	  group”	  (Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Punishment	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide	  1948).	  10	  A	  census	  from	  the	  1930s	  is	  the	  only	  recorded	  ethnic	  identification.	  Approximately	  84	  percent	  of	  Rwanda’s	  population	  identified	  as	  Hutu,	  15	  percent	  as	  Tutsi,	  and	  the	  remaining	  1	  percent	  as	  Twa.	  These	  identities	  were	  indicated	  on	  cards,	  which	  Rwandans	  were	  obliged	  to	  carry	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  1999).	  While	  it	  was	  not	  hard	  to	  move	  throughout	  groups	  prior	  to	  this	  registration	  system,	  it	  became	  challenging	  with	  this	  official	  population	  registration.	  While	  the	  Tutsis	  were	  targeted	  in	  the	  genocide,	  both	  Hutu	  moderates	  and	  Twa	  were	  victim	  to	  the	  extreme	  violence.	  	  11	  An	  estimated	  one	  million	  Hutu	  civilians,	  fearing	  retaliation	  attack	  from	  the	  Tutsis,	  were	  driven	  to	  the	  DRC	  in	  1994.	  This	  influx	  of	  Rwandans	  has	  directly	  contributed	  to	  over	  two	  decades	  of	  unrest	  in	  the	  region.	  Hidden	  among	  the	  refugees	  were	  some	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  genocide	  who,	  exploiting	  the	  ongoing	  insecurity	  in	  the	  DRC	  have	  committed	  multiple	  atrocities	  against	  Congolese	  civilians	  and	  recruited	  child	  soldiers	  claiming	  to	  “protect	  the	  thousands	  of	  remaining	  Hutu	  refugees…with	  no	  official	  refugee	  status”	  (Hellyer	  2015).	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pervasive. Through a national consultation process, Kagame sought advice from China, 
Singapore, and Thailand on how to transform Rwanda from a highly impoverished 
country to “East Africa’s economic hub” (UNDP 2008). Out of these consultations came 
Vision 2020, which ambitiously defines six pillars for development, of which the most 
relevant for this thesis is the enshrinement of education as a key in creating a skilled labor 
market (Government of Rwanda 2016). In a relatively short time, substantial gains have 
been made since the genocide, as seemingly pro-poor educational policies continue to be 
enacted; however, as shown below, many policies have proven superficial, showing that 
this advancement has not been completely beneficial to all. 
This section will expand on the poor state of education pre-1994, which was only 
worsened by the long-lasting role of ethnic discrimination imbued in every part of 
society. Then it will show how both the genocide and its inappropriate responses have 
severely impeded Rwanda’s propounded modernization goals of: guaranteeing high 
quality education and appropriate curricula, eliminating the costs of schooling while 
offering future employment opportunities for graduates, and unifying a country burdened 
by ethnic tensions. Indeed, if the current educational framework continues to operate this 
way, educational attainment will likely continue to deteriorate. 
State of Education Pre-1994  
In identifying factors that led to the mass atrocity in Rwanda, there is a shared 
international consensus that the educational framework and its unofficial quota system at 
least in part, exacerbated the existing ethnic tensions. Before the events of 1994, there 
was a quota system that overtly discriminated on ethnic and regional criteria, rather than 
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scholastic performance. This practice was rooted in the colonialist Belgian government, 
which favored Tutsis, 15 percent of the population, over Hutus. Tutsis were prioritized at 
each level of education, as seen in Table 6; Astrida College was the most prestigious 
school in the country and gave clear preferential treatment to the Tutsi minority.  
Table 6: Astrida College Enrollment by Socio-Identity Group 
Year Tutsi Students Hutu Students 
1932 45 9 
1945 46 3 
1954 63 19 
1959 279 143 
Source: Prunier, 1995: 33. 
The colonial history curriculum portrayed three distinct ethnic groups that 
identified Hutu as aboriginal to Rwanda and Tutsis and Twa as immigrants. In 1962, with 
newly gained independence and a Hutu usurping of power, the Hutu leadership 
intensified these arbitrary distinctions and ostracized the Tutsis as being a foreign alien 
group, with a “tenuous right to Rwandan citizenship or land” (UNESCO 2003, 103). 
Access to education switched from undermining the Hutu populations to overtly 
discriminating against the Tutsis, a policy that was legalized in the 1985 Education Law 
(Leach and Duune 2007, 116).  
 
That these ethnic and regional quotas, based on arbitrary information and one 
outdated population census, were enforced at the educational enrollment level represents 
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how strongly these ethnic tensions were engrained in society. Regional quotas meant that 
those who lived in geographical proximity to the President or his relatives received 
favored status; ethnic quotas were based on a national census conducted in 1933. The 
formula for the population census involved the number of livestock owned: those who 
had between two and ten head of cattle were labeled “Hutu,” those with more than ten 
labored “Tutsi,” and those with only one cow or nothing were labeled “Twa” (Leach and 
Duune 2007, 115).  
Table 7 demonstrates how the educational quota system overrode academic 
considerations, and provided false justification for discriminatory educational access 
(UNESCO 2003, 44). 
Ethnic tensions have long been present in Rwanda, but these quotas taught and 
justified discrimination, resentment, and injustice. Ethnic and regional quotas, in tandem 
with ethnically charged history, reaffirmed and reflected destructive trends in Rwandan 
society about identity. Teachers taught differences instead of commonalities, and 
propounded the Hutu-power ideology that culminated in a wanton massacre.  
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Table 7: Primary School (1-6) Enrollment by Province and Socio-Identity Group 
1989/1990 
Province Hutu Tutsi Twa Other Total 
Butare 90,052 21,146 323 731 112,252 
Byumba 109,477 3,138 154 1,278 114,047 
Cyangugu 66,344 8,573 183 247 75,347 
Gikongoro 57,014 9,906 195 27 67,142 
Gisenyi 107,265 4,002 304 53 111,624 
Kibungo 80,519 8,672 93 198 89,482 
Kibuye 58,846 10,556 72 19 69,493 
Kigali 147,084 19,801 283 1,918 169,086 
Ruhengeri 116,912 728 124 28 117,049 
Total 951,912 99,924 2,052 4,641 1,058,529 
Percentage 89.9 9.4 0.2 0.4 100 
Source: UNESCO 2003, 234 
Further compounding this dangerous context was the inadequate quality of the 
schools. The actual classroom was recognized as inadequate. Part of the tragedy of the 
massacre was that Rwanda was beginning to reform their curriculum in the early 1990s 
by: 
• Rationalizing ongoing syllabi to include environmental studies, health and child care, 
nutrition, and agriculture; 
• Redesigning learning materials; 
• Planning redeployment of Primary 7-8 teachers whose classes had been closed in the 
early 1990s because the teaching and learning materials were insufficient; 
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• Developing new curricula for the new six-year primary cycle and lower-secondary 
schools, especially in child health and nutrition; 
• Discussion on alternative utilization of primary-school workshops; 
• Addressing the selection process for admission for secondary schools (Leach and 
Dunne 2007, 116). 
By 1992, school equipment and teaching materials were insufficient, and the 
quality of education was abysmal. The overall culture in Rwanda did not prioritize 
education, instead praising a “good Rwandan” as a pastoralist, or a “son of the soil,” who 
fully understands the land. The pre-genocide education system is best summarized by the 
then-Minister for Education, Romain Murenzi, in 2002, who stated: 
It is generally felt that the education and specifically the school curriculum 
failed the nation in 1994. The curriculum was silent where it should have 
been eloquent and vocal where it should have been silent. There was much 
about human difference and little about human similarities, too much 
about collective duty and a little about individual responsibility and too 
much about the past and too little about the future (quoted. in Clarke and 
Donoghue 2013, 81). 
  
The institutional affirmation of the Hutu ethnicity through its discriminatory policy 
legitimizes the dividing, longstanding prejudice between the “haves" (the Tutsi) and the 
“have-nots” (the Hutu). Radicalized animosity was solidified by this “moral exclusion” 
and “social death” of the Tutsis, culminating in the world’s fastest and most efficient 
massacre in history (Uvin 1999). 
Reconstructing Education in a Post-Genocide Rwanda 
If Rwanda’s educational system was fragile before the genocide, it was shattered 
during. Schools were ransacked, the Ministry of Education was brought to a standstill, 
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and students and teachers were either murdered or fled (UNESCO 2003, 48). UNICEF 
estimates that, during the genocide, only 648 of the 1,188 schools—often sites of mass 
atrocities themselves—were operational (UNESCO 2003, 48). The irrational role of 
teachers is reflective of the abject chaos facing the society as a whole: teachers often 
symbolized the elite and educated, and therefore were targeted; but they also could be 
Hutu extremists, and harm their colleges. About 75 percent of teachers were either killed 
or subsequently imprisoned on genocide charges; 3,000 primary school teachers were 
murdered (King 2013, 122). By the end of the genocide, the student to qualified teacher 
ratio, already an unimpressive 55:1, deteriorated to 124:1 (UNESCO 2003, 48). There 
was an acute shortage of teachers, schools, and materials to add to the unimaginable 
extent of loss and tragedy Rwandans had to cope with. 
Almost miraculously, the RPF re-opened primary schools by September and, once 
functioning, secondary schools followed. In the wake of one million deaths, razed 
infrastructure, and a broken society, there was impressive educational expansion. By 
1999 there were 2061 new primary schools and the net primary enrollment rate reached 
65 percent (Pells et al. 2014, 295). Teacher (qualified or not) to student ratio returned to 
54:1 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics). The new education policy revolved, first and 
foremost, around targeting national unity and reconciliation. Seemingly non-
discriminatory socioeconomic, linguistic, and ethnic policies were instituted alongside a 
new national curriculum. Quotas and school fees were “removed”; advancement was 
based solely on merit. There were no more identification cards that included ethnicity or 
affiliation. The speed with which this education legislation passed was impressive, but, as 
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seen below, it obscured the inadequacies of these policies and their failure to serve the 
entirety of Rwanda’s people.  
The nascent regime first abolished anything in the education system that 
echoed—what was euphemistically referred to as—“the errors of the past” (UNESCO 
2003, 55). There was no history curriculum that favored Tutsis, as it was under 
colonialism, and no history that favored Hutus, as they did post-independence; instead, 
there was and is no history taught at all. Lacking financial resources and serious 
manpower, the Tutsi dominating government had to create an entirely new pro-education 
society out of one that was believed to have failed the country (King 2013; Freedman et 
al. 2008). The moratorium on teaching history in the classroom allows the government to 
promote one official narrative about the Rwandan identity, but fails to facilitate critical 
thinking or democratic teaching methods that inspire innovative entrepreneurs to bolster a 
knowledge economy (Freedman et al. 2008, 664).  
Part of President Kagame’s Vision 2020 was the decision to shift language policy 
from French to English in schools. Virtually overnight, the coterie of Tutsi political elite, 
mainly from Anglophone Uganda, changed the medium of instruction from French to 
English. Officially, it was to strengthen Rwanda’s economic ties to the West and its 
English-speaking neighbors, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. Unofficially, it is understood 
that Rwanda’s detachment from French is rooted in the RPF’s bitter relationship with the 
country.12 Whatever the justification, the hasty transition to English proved a massive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  During	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  France	  actively	  supported	  the	  Hutu-­‐led	  government	  against	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front,	  providing	  arms	  and	  military	  training	  to	  the	  Interahamwe	  and	  the	  Impuzamugambi,	  which	  were	  the	  predominant	  youth	  militias	  that	  operationalized	  the	  genocide.	  During	  the	  genocide,	  French	  troops	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undertaking for a country where the mother tongue of 90 percent of the population is 
Kinyarwanda. Given that advancement is merit based, the language shift has subtly 
conferred academic advantages to this elite group who already are familiar with English. 
The policy clearly has serious ethnically bias undertones (King 2013). Furthermore, 
teachers are now expected to teach in a language they are still learning. This policy, 
promoted as a move toward Rwanda’s overall development, fails to consider the entire 
country’s advancement. 
In prioritizing modernization for the country, Vision 2020 deems technological 
advancement an integral component of education reform. However, this does not always 
respond well to the current societal priorities. For instance, a One Laptop per Child 
(OLPC) initiative crowded Rwanda’s primary schools in 2012. The program aspired to 
“provide each child with a rugged, low-cost, low-power, connected laptop,” in hopes of 
encouraging creative thinking (One Laptop per Child). 210,000 laptops were delivered at 
almost $200 piece to students and teachers all over the country but resulted in little to no 
improvement in math or reading.13  The ed-tech initiative neglected to train the teachers 
and has been criticized for being more political than pedagogical (Wadhams 2010). 
While President Kagame is striving to make Rwanda a technology and services hub, and 
the OLPC program was a way to spread electricity and Internet to the 93 percent of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  were	  deployed	  to	  prevent	  further	  waves	  of	  genocide,	  but	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  enabling	  Hutu-­‐power	  extremists	  to	  escape	  to	  the	  DRC	  (Penketh	  2014).	  13	  Rwanda	  attempted	  another	  decentralized	  program,	  Girinka	  (One	  Cow	  Per	  Family),	  which	  proved	  much	  more	  effective.	  One	  dairy	  cow	  provided	  to	  poor	  households	  increased	  agricultural	  output	  through	  better	  soil	  fertility	  and	  increased	  incomes	  (Habumuremyi	  2013).	  While	  not	  exclusively	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  education	  policy	  reform,	  this	  kind	  of	  program	  offers	  a	  more	  innovative	  and	  appropriate	  way	  to	  combat	  poverty	  than	  a	  something	  like	  the	  OLPC	  initiative.	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population without it, the funding that went into this ineffective and costly initiative 
could have probably been better allocated (Wadhams 2010). Indeed, it is not without 
some irony that the Education Ministry willingly invests in a burdensome costly 
technology-centered curriculum in the agricultural country while still maintaining a 
moratorium on history lessons. 
The Costs of Education 
As education was posited as the primary tool to nation building, compulsory and 
ostensibly “fee-free” education policies at the primary school level were established post-
genocide. This initiative, and its implementation, has been praised internationally but 
does not address the hidden costs of education, such as examination fees, after-school 
coaching, ‘voluntary’ Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) contributions, school uniforms, 
learning materials, meals and potential compensation in school finances (Williams et al. 
2014, Akaguri 2013). 14 15 Parents are de facto members of the PTA and are required to 
pay a certain amount to supplement teacher salaries and provide the labor to construct 
classrooms with government provided materials.  The PTA additional funds are 
determined by school, so wealthier urban regions contribute more financially than their 
poorer rural counterparts to improve schools. Thus, while the “fee-free” education 
initiative has been met with an impressive surge in enrollment rates, universal education 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Implementing	  some	  form	  of	  fee-­‐free	  education	  policy	  has	  been	  a	  recent	  phenomenon	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  see:	  Malawi	  in	  1994,	  Uganda	  in	  1997,	  Tanzania	  in	  2000,	  and	  Burundi,	  Cameroon,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  in	  2003	  (Nkurunziza	  et	  al.	  2012).	  15	  While	  school	  uniforms	  are	  not	  officially	  mandatory,	  that	  information	  has	  been	  poorly	  disseminated	  and	  it	  is	  a	  de	  facto	  requirement	  in	  most	  schools	  (UNESCO	  2003,	  137).	  	  On	  average,	  a	  school	  uniform	  is	  ten	  to	  20	  times	  more	  expensive	  than	  other	  school	  fees.	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has not yet been reached and a gap remains between enrollment figures and quality 
education (Williams et al. 2014). 
The supposedly “fee-free” schools have also led to a closing of many of the 
higher quality private schools; at least 20 private schools closed between 2013 and 2015. 
The failing private schools tend to be in rural areas. If a private school can only perform 
marginally better than a public school, then it cannot be expected to compete with lower-
fee education offered by the public schools. Meanwhile, the private schools in urban 
areas are thriving. Educated teachers may be more inclined to work at an urban private 
school, where they would receive a higher salary and perhaps be better qualified. It is 
assumed that the Rwandan Tutsi minority, who are mainly based in Kigali, can afford to 
attend these thriving private schools in urban areas, whereas rural areas are subject to 
cheaper but poorer quality schools. A similar effect occurred in Kenya, when a 
nationwide abolition of public fees in 2003 led to a dramatic shift toward private 
schooling, as the quality of the public schools was notably inferior (Nkurunziza et al. 
2012). Thus, despite efforts to improve educational access for all, the majority of the 
quality education is taught by and to Tutsis in urban areas. Similarly, growth in higher 
education has become more easily accessible and the Vocational Education Training 
(VET) programs have become an essential part of the education system. In Rwanda, the 
VET programs run in tandem with secondary education and focus primarily on vocations 
such as building and construction, plumbing, tourism, and hairdressing. These 
occupations are generally focused on urban, rather than rural, development. 
 The hidden costs and disparity in education quality is evident in Rwanda’s 
primary, in comparison to secondary, school enrollment rates. While Rwanda boasts 
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some of the highest primary school enrollment rates in East Africa, with primary 
education standing at 97 percent for boys and 98 percent for girls (UNESCO 2003, 41), 
secondary school enrollments have been slow to expand. The Rwandan government 
responded to this by introducing its Nine Year Basic Education Program (9YBE), which 
adds another three years of supposedly free secondary education onto the relatively free 
education from six years of primary. Still, the required PTA contributions prevent 
education from being genuinely accessible and equal for all and the surge in enrollment 
rates in public schools has been met without adequate teachers or materials, 
corresponding to high dropout rates, repeated grades, and a decline in educational 
outcomes (Leach 2014). 
While socio-economic theory may assume that poor parents are responsive to 
reductions in school costs, there is also a factor of opportunity costs that hamper 
enrollment rates (Krishnaratne et al. 2013). Although the rural population of Rwanda is 
slowly decreasing, the majority of citizens are still overwhelmingly dependent on 
agriculture, so the opportunity cost of time spent in school is high, especially once 
reaching secondary school age (Nkurunziza et al. 2012). This is exacerbated by the lack 
of demand for skilled labor in these subsistence-oriented rural areas, deterring parents 
from putting their children into formal education. The “fee-free” policy has been enacted 
in Rwanda to symbolize that the structural barriers to attain educational achievements 
have been removed. Thus, the onus of responsibility is shifted away from the Education 
Ministry and onto families that choose not to send their children to school. When a family 
cannot afford the hidden costs of education, the fact that these supposedly “fee-free” 
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schools exist indirectly places blame on the culture and “sons of the soil” mindset 
imbedded in the region (Pells et al. 2014, 305).  
The urban-rural disparity may reflect the transformation undergone by Rwanda 
when redefining what makes a “good Rwandan” after the genocide (Pells et al. 2014, 
297). Like many other developing countries, Rwanda defines the role of young people as 
one that accommodates the country’s development goals (Cheney 2007, 41). Prior to 
1994, subsistence farmers were romanticized because of their “intimate knowledge of the 
ecosystem and their ability to extract resources from the land” (Pell 2014, 297). After the 
genocide, an ideal citizen would “move the country beyond subsistence agriculture to a 
knowledge-based middle-income country by 2020” (Pell 2014, 297). This idealization 
paralleled the ethnic political dominance. When Hutus, who were predominantly 
agriculturalists, were in power, a “good Rwandan” was a “son of the soil.” When the 
upper echelon of Tutsis, mainly consisting of merchants and intellectuals, were in 
control, Rwanda became a country whose raison d'être became education. The strong 
push for a knowledge-based society did not fully account for the culture that was so 
deeply entrenched in the country. The policies enacted have, therefore, been less 
cognizant of the demands and desires of the entire population, but have indirectly favored 
the Tutsi minority. This claim is only inferred, as data is difficult to acquire, given the 
abolishing of any Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa identification shortly after the RPF came to power. 
Still, understanding that the majority of Tutsi are in Kigali and the majority of Hutu are 
based in rural areas, this case study concludes that the Rwandan government’s radical 
departure from the societal value through education policies tend to favor wealthier urban 
populations, who tend to be Tutsis. 
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 UNESCO (2014) lists Rwanda next to Laos and Vietnam as a model for reducing 
out-of-school populations by at least 85 percent in five years. This rapid growth in 
enrollment after such terror is certainly impressive; however, evidence shows that its 
policies may fail to achieve reconciliation and economic development—the two main 
objectives for the education system.  
 Due in part to both the genocide and the role of education leading up to the 
tragedy, Rwanda’s government has failed to provide the majority of its population with 
accessible and quality education. In an attempt to abate any lingering ethnic 
fragmentation, the moratorium on history and the language policies have left the 
classroom curricula incomplete. In an effort to modernize, the government has 
misallocated funding away from teacher-training and affordable education and instead 
towards dead-end tech initiatives. Rwanda must openly acknowledge the societal realities 
to improve the divide, reconciling the genocide rather than ignoring it and embracing its 
rural population in education reform rather than excluding it.   
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Case Study 2: Education for South Africa 
 For an emerging market with as much economic prosperity as heralded in South 
Africa, their poor educational performance is inexcusable. South Africa’s education 
system is still in urgent need of reform, or the country will continue to invest heavily in 
education with a virtually negative return on human capital. While Rwandan education 
still remains afflicted with ethnic fragmentation, the following case study examines the 
impact of apartheid on South Africa’s education system to underline the necessity of 
inclusive and adequate policies to adequately combat discrimination and unequal 
education. The racial disparity in schools is found in both the cost and quality of 
education. This thesis finds that the Curriculum 2005 and the Outcomes-based Education 
initiatives have severely exacerbated the challenges facing the education systems and will 
continue to do so without appropriate reform. Finally, South Africa faces the challenges 
of youth unemployment and HIV/AIDS. This section would be remiss not to 
acknowledge how these factors intensify the education system and society as a whole. 
Education in South Africa is fraught with extreme racial disparity, high costs for 
insufficient education, a failing curriculum, and a worrisome future. This section hopes to 
address these shortcomings specifically to provide a platform in the following chapters on 
how to manage and improve education for all students. 
Apartheid and Bantu Education 
 While ethnic fragmentation hampered education in Rwanda, South Africa’s 
apartheid dominates its education history. Apartheid, an Afrikaans term that refers to “the 
state of being apart,” was a system of enforced racial segregation that involved 
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institutional restructuring to serve the interest of white supremacy and the all-white 
National Party government that stood from 1948 to 1994. One of the most racist laws 
under apartheid was its Bantu Education Act of 1953 (Fiske and Ladd 2005). Education 
was a key vehicle in this process of segregation, through which the country chose to 
handle the “native problem” of black South Africans (Fiske and Ladd 2005, 41). Prime 
Minister and Minister of Native Affairs Hendrik Verwoerd extolled the Bantu education 
as “beneficial” for the economy as a whole: 
There is no space for him [the non-white African] in the European 
Community above certain forms of labor [ie: unskilled labor and 
servitude]. For this reason it is of no avail for him to receive training 
which has its aim in the absorption of the European Community, where 
he cannot be absorbed. Until now [1953] he has been subjected to a 
school system which drew him away from his community and misled him 
by showing him the greener pastures of European Society where he is not 
allowed to graze (quoted in Gilmore and Donald 1999, 341). 
 
Each department of education was separated by race: the Department of Education and 
Training was responsible for black South Africans (80 percent of the population), the 
House of Delegates was responsible for Indian South Africans (2 percent), the House of 
Representatives was responsible for “colored” South Africans (9 percent), and the 
Transvaal Education Department was responsible for white South Africans (9 percent) 
(Morrow 1990, 174). The curriculum denigrated black Africans’ history, culture, and 
identity by perpetuating racial myths and stereotypes in its curricula and textbooks.  
 Apartheid was specifically designed to bar non-whites from participating in 
highly remunerative roles in the economy. The adverse effects on education for non-
white students cannot be understated: dilapidated school buildings, overcrowded 
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classrooms, inadequate teacher-training plagued the schools and preserved the social 
hierarchy that correlated race and class (Obed Bapela 2006). The glaring inequalities 
concerning classroom quality can be found in Table 8, where the student-teacher ratio for 
white students was less than half of that of black students and the difference in certified 
teachers was a staggering 15 percent for black students and almost 100 percent for white. 
Table 8: Government Spending on Education per Child 1982 (in SA Rand) 
 Government 
Spending on 
Education 
Student-Teacher 
Ratio 
Teachers with 
Certificates 
White Student 1211 1:18 96% 
Indian Student 771 1:24 Unavailable 
Colored Student 498 1:27 Unavailable 
Black Student 146 1:40 15% 
Source: Kallaway 2002, 40.  
At its peak, the apartheid regime allocated ten times the amount of funding for schools 
serving white students as it did for schools serving nonwhites (Fiske and Ladd 2005). 
Educational equity is often defined in terms of equal educational opportunity, equal 
treatment, and equal educational adequacy (Fiske and Ladd 2005). Apartheid was, simply 
put, the antithesis of educational equality.  
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Failed Transitioning from Race-based to Race-blind 
 By the time the democratic elections of 1994 ended the apartheid era, the nascent 
democracy, led by President Nelson Mandela, inherited a fragmented governmental 
institution and a belligerent society keen on total structural overhaul. As one analyst 
phrased it, the new government was charged with the task of “changing the wheel while 
the car was moving” (Sehoole 2003, 1). The education ministry first reconstructed the 18 
racially divided departments into nine provincial “race blind” ones, under the auspices of 
one united national education ministry (Gibson 2006, 785). The expectation for this 
united ministry was both to modernize and unify a country that had been fiercely divided. 
Funding was now distributed equally, with each province receiving the same lump sum 
grants based on population size. The districts could then autonomously allocate that grant 
autonomously to its health, education, and welfare services. At the policy level, it 
appeared that equity defined as race-blindness was achieved. 
This pro-poor educational policy has, however, continued to further the legacy of 
apartheid. Public schools have virtually been separated into two bands of schooling: the 
fee-schools which tend to be smaller, better performing, and target the wealthiest 20 to 25 
percent of the student population; and the larger, worse-performing free-schools, that 
accommodate the poorest 75 to 80 percent (Spaull 2013). Because the testing outcomes 
do not report race or economic status, it is challenging to determine racial education gaps. 
However, education expert Nick Taylor examined the Western Cape in 2004 to find that 
80 percent of grade 6 children who had attended formally exclusively white primary 
schools could read at the correct level, whereas less than 50 percent of learners attending 
formerly non-white primary schools could read at the right level (Taylor 2009). 
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Moreover, he found massive disparities in performance between schools, to a large extent 
due to the structural repression faced by black Africans. The results of Table 9 
powerfully illustrate the scale of the achievement gap.  
Table 9: Distribution of high schools by performance in Senior Certificate 
mathematics, 2004 
 
 Formerly 
Privileged* 
African Total Proportion 
of total 
Proportion 
of HG math 
passes 
Top 
Performing 
** 
380 34 414 7% 66% 
Moderately 
Performing 
254 573 827 14% 19% 
Poor 
Performing 
600 4,277 4,877 79% 15% 
Total 1,234 4,884 6,118 100% 100% 
Source: Taylor 2009, 11 
Note: *Under apartheid “privileged” schools were administered to white students. 
Note: **Top performances produce at least 30 percent of students who pass the exam, 
with 20 percent performing the strongest nationally; moderately performing schools 
produce at least 30 percent at a standard grade; poor performing schools fail to achieve 
30 percent passes in math. 
 
Equally distributed public education grants fund teachers salaries, school 
infrastructure, and textbooks. About ten percent of the education budget is also allocated 
for a pro-poor subsidy for books and learning materials. Public schools are legally 
accessible to any student of any race. However, many of these “inclusive” public schools 
can discriminate socioeconomically. Two out of five public schools are allowed to charge 
additional fees to attend the school (averaging to about $130), which disqualifies poorer, 
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often non-white learners from admission (Taylor 2009, 14).  These fee-schools tend to be 
in wealthier, all-white areas and can acquire more financial support from their students, 
and therefore can reinvest in more resources. Thus, economic and cultural influences 
encourage students to remain in their same, pre-1994 schools: “most African learners 
were still in mainly African schools” (Fiske and Ladd 2004, 4).  
That these fee-schools can discriminate based on socioeconomic status, and 
because race and economic standing are so intertwined in South Africa, the movement 
from race-based to race-blind policies has proven to be merely symbolic. As shown in 
Table 11, South Africa still finds that large racial differences in terms of progress and 
educational attainment persist and continue to impact the distribution of teachers (Bhorat 
and Oosthuizen 2008, van der Berg 2008). The 2012 World Economic Forum ranked 
South Africa 132 among 144 countries in primary school education and 143 in math and 
sciences (World Economic Forum 2012).  
Table 10: SACMEQ II Scores for Grade 6 Math in year 2000 
QUINTILE (Poorest)1 2 3 4 (Richest)5 Mean 
Botswana 491 499 510 508 557 513 
Kenya 540 545 555 565 611 563 
Lesotho 443 448 448 445 452 447 
Malawi 422 427 435 433 447 433 
Mauritius 519 564 587 620 640 584 
Mozambique 526 525 531 530 538 530 
Namibia 403 402 411 425 513 431 
Seychelles 520 541 555 576 579 544 
South Africa 442 445 454 491 597 486 
Swaziland 506 511 511 513 541 517 
Tanzania 484 511 529 528 560 522 
Uganda 484 497 498 509 543 506 
Zambia 414 425 436 434 466 435 
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Zanzibar 478 472 478 479 484 478 
Mean 468 480 485 492 560 468 
Source: Taylor 2009, 8. 
 
Table 10 demonstrates South Africa’s poor performance in relation to schools 
with substantially fewer economic resources through SACMEQ scores, a national exam 
taken to progress to the next year. While, in general, poverty is strongly associated with 
performance, it is not a guarantee for South Africa. Indeed, even though the educational 
disparity is starkly recognized in South Africa, it is still outperformed by Kenya and 
Mauritius; the lower four quintiles fall below the SACMEQ all-country means.  
Ostensibly, all public school teachers are paid the same amount, regardless of 
location or class size. However, fee-schools are able to provide a “top-up” to their 
teachers. As one may expect, the more qualified teachers are then encouraged to work at 
wealthy fee-schools that may pay supplemental bonuses. Such is the case that 
overworked teachers in poorer schools may therefore be paid less, while better quality 
teachers are paid more with smaller class sizes. The supply and retention of qualified 
teachers needs to be of primary focus for South Africa. Encouraging more university 
students to join the profession and offering special incentives to teach at poorer schools 
could help ameliorate the education race gap. Additionally, increasing salaries and 
benefits, while providing more support, may encourage a larger number of professionals 
to become teachers, thereby improving the student retention rate.  
 Namibia, a neighboring country also subjected to apartheid, addressed teacher 
quality differently from South Africa and, while not performing well overall, does not 
show the same extreme stark disparity in educational attainment. While the new state 
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wanted to reject the hegemonic apartheid era, there was a serious push for educators to 
assist in the transformation of the education policy (Ahlstrom et al. 1999). Additionally, 
teacher education was a priority, and the liberation movement sent teachers abroad for 
their training (Dahlström 2002, 85). As stated by Lars Dahlström in her book Post-
Apartheid Teacher Education Reform in Namibia, “many Namibians were educated on 
commission for the liberation movement not by the liberation movement” (2002, 86). 
Thus, along with Namibia’s 1990 independence came the development of critical 
pedagogy and reconstructive ideologies of education. Teachers who understood the 
classroom dynamics clarified the purpose and goals of educational reform, thus it was 
clear and realistic upon implementation. A national three-year pre-service program to 
train teachers for grades 1 to 10 established quality education by the time schools were up 
and running (Dahlström 2002, 105). The case of Namibia reinforces the absolute requisite 
role that teachers play in implementing new reform and improving educational attainment 
for all.
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Table 11: Educational Attainment for 25-29 years old, South Africa 2002-2010 
Educational 
attainment African Colored White 
 2002-2004 
2005-
2007 
2008-
2010 
2002-
2004 
2005-
2007 
2008-
2010 
2002-
2004 
2005-
2007 
2008-
2010 
Less than grade 9 25.7 22.8 19.6 31.0 21.1 18.5 1.7 3.5 2.2 
Grade 9 8.3 9.0 9.0 11.1 9.9 10.6 1.8 1.5 1.4 
Grade 10 11.6 11.9 13.1 10.9 12.2 14.0 12.2 10.4 7.1 
Grade 11 15.7 17.2 18.1 7.4 12.0 11.0 3.2 3.9 1.6 
Grade 12 31.3 31.5 31.8 33.8 37.1 36.7 47.8 47.3 48.9 
Post-Matric 
Diploma 5.1 5.9 6.9 4.3 5.9 7.2 15.3 15.3 20.4 
University degree 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 18.0 18.1 18.3 
At least grade 12 38.7 39.1 40.2 39.7 44.8 45.9 81.2 80.7 87.6 
Beyond grade 12 7.4 7.6 8.3 5.9 7.8 9.2 33.3 33.4 38.8 
% Grade 12s with 
University degree 5.8 4.4 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.3 22.2 22.4 20.9 
Observations 18606 19464 19077 2552 3192 2324 1547 1080 893 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. South Africa General Household Survey 2002-20010 
Note: University degrees include degrees from traditional universities, comprehensive universities, and universities of 
technology 
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Failed Curriculum Reform: Outcomes-based Education and C2005 
 The rapid policy transformation from a race-based to all-inclusive school system 
was also met with a shift in curriculum reform. Because apartheid was so entrenched in 
the education system, the Education Ministry aimed to “cleanse” South Africa of all 
residual discriminatory effects, including those within the curriculum. This led to the 
enactment of Curriculum 2005 (C2005) and, with it, the establishment of Outcomes 
Based Education (OBE) (UNESCO 2014). Launched in 1997 with great fanfare, C2005 
aimed to make access and quality of education more equitable while also decentralizing 
oversight to the national education system to the South African provinces (Jansen 1998). 
The staggered implementation of OBE, which began shortly thereafter, was intended to 
replace the rote memorization approach to learning, standard during apartheid, with a 
more liberal, learner-centered pedagogy (Mouton et al. 2012, 1213). Within a year, 
curriculum developers, teachers, unions, and international business representatives 
collaborated in a frenzy to make OBE work. Driven by a commitment to social justice, 
the OBE curriculum prioritized round table discussions and expressions of opinions 
rather than literacy, writing, and mathematics. It was intended, in many ways, to be the 
pedagogical route out of apartheid education (Chisholm 2004, 3). The curriculum also 
consisted of two stages: compulsory General Education and Training (GET) from Grades 
1 to 9, and Further Education Training (FET) from grades 10 to 12. 
 The OBE concept was relatively successful in privileged, usually white, school 
districts, where teachers were more qualified and enjoyed smaller classroom sizes and 
tended to have access to quality textbooks. Despite past standard rote-education 
structures, teachers and students were quickly able to acclimatize to the critical thinking 
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pedagogy that was central to OBE (Fiske and Ladd 2004). Wealthy and white-dominated 
schools were more able to adopt the new curriculum reform, given the strong governing 
structures and stable educational institutions established during apartheid. Conversely, 
poorer schools that tended to serve black students found the implementation of OBE to be 
expensive and nearly impossible. Teachers were not properly trained to adopt this new 
pedagogical style, and were expected to create their own learning programs and materials 
without much support (Mouton et al. 2012). Instead of providing basic training in literacy 
or mathematics in more effective ways than rote memorization, these subjects were 
simply ignored completely. While Rwanda tried to control and silence their tragic history 
in the classroom through a moratorium on history lessons, South Africa optimistically let 
the classroom be subsumed by it as a form of reconciliation. However, it failed to fully 
consider the legacy of disparity and inequality in this new reform. Both curricula 
extremes in response to ethnic tensions have proved profoundly ineffective. 
 A lack of realistic, substantial investment in human capital and physical 
resources—67 percent of schools lacked electricity, 83 percent lacked libraries, 34 
percent lacked running water, and 21 percent lacked toilet facilities—failed to provide the 
basic structure OBE required to be successful (Mouton et al. 2012, 1213). The result was 
a severe fall in literacy rates and a deterioration of the education system. The results were 
completely opposite of what the Ministry of Education intended at the start of C2005. 
 The incongruity between the expectations of the reforms and classroom reality 
was partially due to the lack of assessment or analysis before the drafting and 
implementation of C2005. Even more startling was that the Ministry of Education was 
then tasked with the responsibility of monitoring the effectiveness of this policy. Given 
	  	  	  	  
54	  
the difficulty and overly detailed monitoring and evaluations required from teachers for 
assessments, the data were rarely collected (Mouton et al. 2012, 1211). 
 Many academics, particularly at the university level, were critical of the OBE and 
C2005 from the very start. Most famously, Rector and Vice Chancellor at the University 
of Western Cape Jonathan Jansen, a strong advocate for an improved education system, 
wrote “Why OBE Will Fail” (1998). He deemed the educational debate to be more 
philosophical and ideological than practical, and maintained that politicians were using 
revolutionary progress in education as a political tool rather than as a rational plan of 
what the schools needed (Jansen 1998). In his article, he offered ten major reasons why 
OBE will negatively impact South African schools:  
1) The complex and contradictory language of the OBE curriculum policy  
2) The unrealistic and overly idealistic relationship between curriculum and society 
3) The policy being based on flawed assumptions about classroom structure and teacher 
quality 
4) The policy’s anti-democratic fixation of outcomes  
5) The uneven, fragmented, and sometimes completely non-existent official support in 
schools to implement the policy 
6) The policy’s failure to require policy makers to identify the actual purpose of 
education  
7) The increasing administrative expectations on already overburdened teachers  
8) A fixation with outcomes and discrete competences, causing OBE to trivialize the 
important cross-curricular and interdisciplinary demands that build long-term 
transferrable skills  
9) OBE’s requirement of inputs that South Africa simply did not have, e.g., trained and 
retrained teachers, new forms of assessment, classroom organization that works in 
tandem with monitoring and assessment, parental support and involvement, etc. 
10) The demand for an overly burdensome system of assessment (Jansen 1998). 
 
 By 2005, Jansen’s dire predictions came to fruition. Unfortunately, the mission to 
spawn innovation through the OBE curriculum actually undermined the already fragile 
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school system. Moreover, it exacerbated the educational gap between white and black 
Africans. Wealthier, predominantly white schools were able to survive relatively 
unscathed by the initiative, while poorer, predominantly non-white schools without the 
resources needed to reform their curriculum structure, collapsed (Chisholm 2004, 4). 
 To address and improve the failed 1997 initiative, the Board developed the 
Revised National Curriculum Statement in 2000, which promoted a clearer and more 
coherent curriculum design while still focusing on societal justice (Chisholm 2004, 4). 
The committee that drafted and implemented this new educational policy recommended 
the promotion of smaller class sizes, a reintroduction of history, and clearer problem-
solving lessons.  Still, it did not fully address the difficulties in the monitoring and 
reviewing process. The OBE stayed in place.  
 Further complicating this morass was a political struggle among teacher unions. 
The South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU) is the largest in terms of 
members, and plays a powerful role in South African society and government (Chisholm 
2004, 7). As with most of these unions, SADTU was established during the anti-
apartheid, pre-1994 struggle and defined itself as the opposition to racially based school 
systems. After 1994, many unqualified teachers were “catapulted” into leadership 
positions in the national education system and other bureaucratic posts (Chisholm 2004, 
7). The unions had played a major role in the drafting, formulating, and implementing of 
C2005 beginning in 1997 and were insulted to change any policies of their own. Thus, 
while the unions generally supported the overall direction of the revision, they were 
generally reluctant to adopt specific steps for improvement. As dominant leaders in the 
educational realm, teacher unions were major actors in the role of C2005 and their 
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resistance most likely contributed to what kept the dysfunctional policy in place after it 
was proved ineffective. 
 Regarded as a failed social experiment, OBE and C2005 were quietly shelved by 
2005, and a more standard education policy took their place. Still, the racially based 
educational attainment gap had widened during this time because of the C2005’s tenure. 
While basic education is still compulsory, South Africa performs badly, with only about 
71.2 percent of grade six students being literate and 58.6 percent numerate (Wilkinson 
2013). Furthermore, according to a UNESCO report, about half of every cohort that 
enters the schooling system does not complete grade 12 (UNESCO 2011). Of the 1.1 
million black South Africans who were born in 1994, fewer than half have progressed to 
take the final graduation examination. Of those who were able to take the exam, only 
73.9 percent passed; the passing score is extraordinarily low at 30 percent (Dixon 2014). 
While the detriment of the education crisis on students is widely presumed to be 
particularly acute for poor black South Africans, failure remains hard to measure, as test 
results are not broken down by race or socioeconomic status. However, evidence such as 
the previous Table 10 (see: page 48) allows for substantial speculation. 
The OBE policies made substandard education a norm in the majority of large 
South African public schools. While the new curriculum objectives were certainly 
detrimental, it does seem unrealistic to expect the nation to disengage successfully from 
the seemingly inescapable legacy of apartheid in only two decades. Still, South Africa 
can take clearer steps to solidify a stronger foundation and purpose for the education 
system to build upon so that, in the long run, the wounds from the apartheid can heal. 
South Africa can learn from Namibia, and focus on teacher development in whatever way 
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possible, to insure that teachers in poorer districts are capable of creating an educated 
next generation. The inequitable impact of apartheid produced generations of teachers 
with racially twisted understandings of society and status quo (Barbarin and Richter 
2001), and South Africa’s teachers need to be re-taught and re-introduced to the new 
societal realities in their country. Moreover, they need to be efficiently utilized and 
managed so that they can teach what they are qualified to teach. This is not the case in the 
situation left over from the C2005 initiative.  
 South Africa’s newest initiative, the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP), 
provides a “holistic approach” to build economic advancement for the poorest Africans 
through improving education, infrastructure, rural development, healthcare, and social 
protection (South Africa Ministry of Education, 2012). Implemented in February 2013, 
the initiative aims to tackle the education crisis by bolstering teacher-training programs, 
increasing the number of students who achieve above 50 percent in literacy and 
mathematics by creating smaller class sizes, and raising retention rates to 90 percent with 
more practical curriculums. It plans on providing stronger incentives to ensure its 
effective implementation for teachers. Still, the psychological damage of apartheid that 
still imbues society needs to be confronted and addressed. Until then, the social and 
educational distance between differing racial groups will not improve, and the lives of 
disadvantaged South Africans will continue worsen. It is evident that simply spending on 
basic education, which is over 7 percent of government expenditure, will not provide 
textbooks and qualified graduates. Reasonable policies and curriculum that relate to the 
realities of South African society need to be implemented alongside teacher-training 
programs and development education programs. Moreover, substantial financial and 
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qualitative resources need to be targeted to poorer populations in order for any hope of 
academic, economic, and social equality. 
Additional Factors Hindering Educational Achievement 
Youth unemployment has been increasing precipitously since 2008; at 63 percent 
in 2013, South Africa’s youth unemployment rate was one of the highest in the world. 
This disconnection between curricula and the post-school sector is, no doubt, a major 
factor in this overall worsening unemployment rate (Wilkinson 2013). That wealthier, 
predominantly white schools perform better condemns non-whites to the lower income 
brackets in society (Spaull 2013, 8). Graduates entering an inflexible job market are 
deemed unqualified and quickly become disillusioned. While enrollment rates have 
improved considerably since post-apartheid, the average standard is poor: South Africa 
ranks 146 out of 148 in educational standards, according to the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report (2014-15, 13). Because the quality of education and the 
outcomes of schooling have so severely devolved, the value of a secondary education 
degree is atrophying. Education is not only poor, but the return on education is negligible.  
The unemployment crisis reflects the racial biases found in the education system.  
While the proportion of non-white race groups has seen the largest increase in workforce 
participation, the skilled workforce for black Africans has only improved by three percent 
since 1994. The white workforce has increased by 19 percentage points in the same time 
span (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2014). While the proportion of non-workers has 
increased across population groups, within the same groups there is clearly lower African 
employment growth than the white population groups. Similarly significant is the reality 
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that the black African group aged 25-34 years old has seen a decrease in skilled 
employment.  
Efforts to keep children in school and succeeding later on are further complicated 
by the HIV/AIDS endemic (See Figure 2).  
Source: The World Databank 2016 
 Despite 42 percent of patients diagnosed receiving the antiretroviral treatment, the 
disease has spread to over 6.3 million South Africans, about 20 percent of the population. 
The public health calamity most drastically impacts black Africans: 15 percent of black 
Africans are infected with HIV/AIDS while only 0.3 percent of whites are (Pennap et al. 
2011, 24). This is further compounded with the correlation found between socioeconomic 
background and the likelihood of a person testing positive for HIV. Those with a higher 
level of education and employment are more likely to have accurate information about 
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the disease and have demonstrated a higher perception of risk (Pennap et al. 2011). 
Poorer areas are less likely to be tested, because testing units are not as available, and that 
can clearly be detrimental to the learning process. Here emerges a vicious circle: 
HIV/AIDS is correlated highly with high dropout rates; dropping out of school 
compromises a student from receiving effective HIV and sex education. Measures have 
been taken to account for the lack of sex education, such as Soul City, was a multi-media 
campaign to raise awareness for HIV/AIDS on television (UNAIDS 2004). The 
campaign, which encouraged positive behavioral change, reached 65 percent of rural 
people who may not have had this type of exposure previously.  
 There is a longstanding trend of disadvantaging black South Africans in 
education. That they are the predominant victims to the HIV/AIDS epidemic furthers the 
positive feedback loop, cornering the demographic into a worse situation in terms of 
future opportunity. Looking forward, South Africa’s Education Ministry must take these 
considerations into account to achieve genuine equality in the educational and societal 
realm. 
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Case Study 3: Education for Ghana 
Similar to South Africa, the Ghanaian government has demonstrated a historical 
commitment to education since independence. Indeed this relentless focus on sound 
policy geared towards improving education quality is part of what makes its deteriorating 
school system so puzzling. Across various regime changes, these noble ambitions have 
each eventually proven futile. While it has been relatively successful in progressing 
adolescents from primary to secondary level education, 46 percent of lower secondary 
age males and 60 percent of lower secondary age females are out of school. Moreover, a 
large proportion do not stay in school long enough to take the Senior Secondary 
Certificate Examination (SSCE).  
Today, the Ministry of Education, represented by ten regional offices and 138 
district offices, is responsible for national educational policy, technical and secondary 
vocational education, and for continuing the implementation of the educational policy. 
The country currently has over 12,000 primary schools, 5,000 junior secondary schools, 
700 senior secondary schools, and nine universities (three private, six public), clearly 
improving education access. Additionally, school is compulsory for children between the 
ages of six and 15. Since its inception, the management of the Ghanaian educational 
system has improved immensely but is still marred by procedural bottlenecks. 
Unfortunately, the injection of enormous resources into the schools has not improved 
efficacy of these school systems. This section explains the history of education policy in 
Ghana to understand how Ghanaian education still suffers from the lack of adequate 
teachers, student absenteeism, and burdensome curriculum reliant on rote learning 
(UNESCO 2006). The failures of the school system pervade every level of schooling and 
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while students may be enrolling in secondary education, they are filling overcrowded, 
under-resourced classrooms. Moreover, the supposed “fee-free” public education 
involves a variety of costs and is widely corrupt. This section will challenge Ghana’s 
successful performance in this thesis’ regression model, noting that substantial work 
needs to be done to provide quality education for all students. 
A History of Education 
Early educational efforts date back to 1529, when Portuguese Castle Schools were 
founded and continued by Christian missionaries into pre-colonial Ghana (Owu-Ewie 
2006, 76). In 1925, British colonial rule further solidified a formal education 
administration. Throughout, the access was predominantly limited to the privileged 
Ghanaian elite (Graham 1971).  
In 1957, Ghana acted as inspiration for sub-Saharan Africa when it was the first 
country in the region to gain independence. Led by Kwame Nkrumah, the new 
democracy promoted education and the establishment of a socialist society. The claim 
was that the foremost goal of education was to produce an educated workforce that could 
propel Ghana into a middle-income level country (Akyeampong 2010). Nkrumah’s 
inclusive idealism stood in clear contrast to the more exclusive colonial period, focusing 
on best serving the masses in terms of education, health, and infrastructure. In 
recognizing the urgency to build the nation’s human resource capacity, Nkrumah’s 
administration introduced the groundbreaking 1961 Education Act, which made basic 
education compulsory and ostensibly free. More secondary schools were established, and 
a focus on alleviating illiteracy was entrenched in public policy. However, this emphasis 
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on growth and improved access failed to account for an insufficient supply of teachers 
and did not expand outwards to Northern Ghana, the poorest region in the country.  
Table 12 shows the resulting surge of enrollment rates, but does not illustrate the 
clash it had with quality, as classrooms were overfilled and educational quality 
deteriorated. The heavy investment in establishing schools and writing textbooks was not 
met with improvements in the quality of these schools or teachers. The critical lack of 
these resources was exacerbated by Nkrumah’s profligate economic policies, which often 
consisted of poorly planned investments and unreliable projects that steered the Golden 
Coast’s economy and infrastructure into turmoil (Akyeampong 2010).  
 
Table 12: Expansion in Educational Enrollment Between 1951 and 1966 
 1951 1966 
Type of School Number Schools 
Number 
Students 
Number 
Schools 
Number 
Students 
Primary 1,083 153,360 8,144 1,137,495 
Middle 539 66,179 2,277 267,434 
Secondary 13 5,033 105 42,111 
Teacher-training 22 1,916 83 15,144 
Technical 5 622 11 4,956 
University 2 208 3 4,291 
Source: Akyeampong et al. 2007, 6 
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While the early education policies seemed promising, they did not guarantee that 
enrollment rates and quality would progress in tandem; it was unrealistic to expect access 
to meaningful education for all. 
A military coup in 1966 ousted the socialist regime and sparked decades of 
political instability that further stalled educational progress. The new National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) neglected whatever momentum President Nkrumah had 
initiated for free and universal education. The military regime, combined with the 
country’s economic recession, significantly derailed access to school. Drastic reduction 
of funding for all levels of education, combined with poor management and general 
corruption in schools, dashed any hope of developing a strong educational system 
(Akyeamopong 2010; MacBeth 2010). Further compounding the education crisis was an 
incredible “brain drain” of qualified teachers. As a result of poor remuneration and 
meager teaching conditions, over a third of the Ghanaian teaching population travelled 
east to Nigeria and even Libya between 1978 and 1984 (Obeng 2002, 31).  Those that 
stayed in Ghana, therefore, were overburdened and demoralized. For decades, the 
education system continued to be hampered by inadequate learning materials, a chronic 
shortage of teachers, and overcrowded classrooms—a situation that prevented any 
effective intellectual development in Ghana. By 1983, the Ghanaian education system 
was in a state of crisis and widely recognized to be in dire need of reform (MacBeth 
2010).  
With the Reforms of 1987, the Ghanaian Education Ministry partnered with the 
World Bank to revamp the education system to be more inclusive, efficient, and effective. 
Some of the education policies were intended to implement superficial solutions, such as 
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reducing the number of years in school from 17years to 12, this being more appealing to 
rural families, and lowering the cost of the Common Entrance Exam for secondary 
education (MacBeth 2010).16 The Reforms of 1987 also included a Whole School 
Development Program that decentralized the education structure and sought to promote:  
• The quality of teaching and learning of literacy, numeracy, and problem-solving in 
primary schools 
• Community participation in schools 
• School-based, in-service teacher-training 
• Participatory planning at school and district levels 
• Improved efficiency in resource management (MacBeth 2010, 29). 
These reforms yielded mixed results, likely because the system was both under- 
and over-financed. Money flowed towards expanding the number of schools and filling 
the classrooms with materials, but teacher-training was neglected and the shortage of 
teachers was still hindering true development. The “hardware” was easier to invest in and 
improve than the much-needed “software” that would ensure academic achievement. 
Because the government invested in infrastructure and access, not teacher-training or 
quality, students were placed at desks, but real educational opportunities were capped. 
While this thesis’ prediction model shows that secondary education attainment improved 
during this time, it cannot ignore that the quality of public education in Ghana continues 
to fail its population.  
 A new democratic era was sparked in 1992, with relatively peaceful transitions 
between the NDC and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) (Little 2010). Education policy was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  1961	  Education	  Act	  made	  elementary	  schools	  free	  and	  compulsory	  for	  six	  years	  of	  basic	  education,	  followed	  by	  another	  four	  years	  of	  elementary	  school,	  followed	  by	  another	  five	  years	  of	  secondary	  education,	  concluding	  with	  two	  years	  of	  college	  preparatory	  education.	  The	  burdensome	  and	  costly	  17	  years	  required	  of	  pre-­‐university	  education	  was	  later	  reformed	  in	  1987.	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again revamped to require decentralizing the school systems to local districts and 
communities as well as to implement fee-free, compulsory schooling, reminiscent of 
Nkrumah’s concept of basic education (Akyeampong 2010, 21).  
Costs, Corruption, and Quality 
While the curriculum has been nationalized, the education ministry is working to 
give administrative power to the local districts and school levels. The school-based 
management initiative means that families, teachers, and local authorities are responsible 
for the success of the public schools throughout Ghana. Each school has a Parent Teacher 
Association (PTA) that can choose how to distribute funds and whether they need to be 
supplemented. The effectiveness of a school-based management system relies not only on 
the participation and capabilities of the parents and communities, but also on the 
accountability of the participating actors to best benefit the students (Bogaert et al. 2012). 
However, this level of involvement varies across communities, depending on 
socioeconomic status and the community’s prioritization of education. In poorer areas, 
the PTA contributions will likely be lower than in those wealthier regions. While deemed 
compulsory and “free,” education is burdened with nominal costs of education that must 
be considered when looking at the factors impacting educational attainment in Ghana. 
Without proper autonomy and transparency, decentralizing education has the 
potential lead to corruption and bribery.  Indeed, according to Table 13 the 2015 Global 
Corruption Barometer evidenced that 24 percent of Ghanaians reported paying a bribe, 
giving a gift, or doing a favor for public schools at least once, making this one of the 
highest education-related bribery rates in the region (Transparency International 2015 
	  	  	  	  
67	  
38). The report claims that this corruption in education is particularly burdensome for the 
poor, who are twice as likely to be subject to the dysfunctional corruption. Moreover, 
corruption in these rural areas may misallocate funds, hindering the school and its 
students from having improving as intended.  
Table 13: Bribery Rates in Public School System 2015 
Country Bribery Rate (%) Country Bribery Rate (%) 
Regional Average 22   
Benin 26 Mali 18 
Botswana 1 Mauritius 1 
Burkina Faso 11 Namibia 7 
Burundi 14 Niger 10 
Cameroon 48 Nigeria 43 
Cape Verde 2 Senegal 8 
Cote d’Ivoire 34 Sierra Leone 41 
Ghana 36 South Africa 7 
Guinea 35 Swaziland 9 
Kenya 37 Tanzania 25 
Lesotho 5 Togo 26 
Liberia 69 Uganda 38 
Madagascar 16 Zambia 17 
Malawi 13 Zimbabwe 22 
Source: People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015, 38. 
 The failure in Ghanaian public education has led to a shift in demand towards 
private schools for those who can afford it, despite the “fee-free” policies implemented 
by the government in 1992. Research shows that these low-cost private schools generally 
employ higher quality curricula than their public school counterparts; however, they cost 
about twice as much as the “fee-free” public schools (Tooley and Dixon 2006). This has 
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been true since “special primary schools” were established to benefit the Ghanaian elite: 
“In 1972, 21% of students from special primary schools appeared among the first 1,000 
best performing candidates, compared with less than one percent of students from 
government schools” (Akyeampong 2010, 9). During the NPP regime, even more private 
institutions were set up from primary level to the university level, to further improve the 
education for the Ghanaian elite. 
While still considered to be largely an urban phenomenon, private schools have 
been increasingly present in rural areas, as shown in Table 14:  
Table 14: Type of School Attended by Household Poverty Status 2005/2006  
Poverty status Schooling Type Enrolled in private school (%) 
 No School Public Private  
Extremely Poor 36.4 58.5 5.09 8.0 
Poor 20.1 69.0 10.9 13.6 
Non-Poor 13.2 60.1 26.7 30.8 
Total 22.6 60.5 16.9 21.8 
Source: Tooley and Dixon 2009. 
Note: For children aged 6 to 17. 
 
 That private schools currently account for over 20 percent of all primary 
enrollment rates raises the issue of affordability and equity. Even though private schools 
claim to be “low fee,” households that send children to private schools incur significantly 
higher costs than do those who remain at the public schools. Private schools work hard to 
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attract students from all socioeconomic levels, with enticements like the price of 
enrollment being reduced for every additional child enrolled (Akaguri 2013).  
 Meanwhile, public schools do little to induce demand, are generally perceived as 
of poorer quality, and still incur some costs. While public education is deemed “free,” 
there are supplementary costs such as uniforms, school supplies, and ad hoc infrastructure 
requirements that families are expected to pay (Bogaert et al 2012, 291). Table 15 
compares the average total cost of private schools to public schools for an individual 
child.  
Table 15: Household Unit Costs per Child for Public and Private Schools (USD) 
Item Public Cost Private Cost 
Transport to and from School 0 5.73 
Food at School 18.97 28.39 
Tuition Fees 0 9.33 
Parents’ Contributions (PTA) 1.3 0.99 
Examination Fees 0.76 1.77 
Extra Classes 0 7.66 
School Uniforms 10.02 8.33 
Stationary / Textbooks / Pens / etc. 6.05 7.0 
Average Total Cost : 32.74 62.06 
Source: Akyeampong 2010. 
On average, the total cost of private school is twice that of public school. Table 15 
shows the variation across socioeconomic quintiles, emphasizing the income elasticity of 
poor households. For poor households to opt for private education, no matter how “low-
	  	  	  	  
70	  
fee,” is a huge sacrifice. Therefore, the weak accountability in public schools and the 
sense of purpose exhibited by low-fee private schools makes private education that much 
more attractive, even for the poor. For families who are willing to sacrifice private 
education, they may deem the difference in price reasonable in comparison to the 
difference in quality. Given the significance of the final examination for graduation, 
demand for private schools will continue to rise. If the government does not improve the 
education system as it stands, there is an opportunity to support the disadvantaged poor to 
attend these higher quality private schools.   
Table 16: Mean Household Income by Quintile 
Quintile 
First 
Quintile 
(Lowest 
Income) 
Second 
Quintile 
Third 
Quintile 
Fourth 
Quintile 
Fifth Quintile 
(Highest 
Income) 
Mean 208 355 518 875 1,909 
Median 222 360 540 900 1575 
Minimum 45 273 432 540 900 
Maximum 270 432 630 1080 4680 
 
Average 
proportion 
income on 
public 
education 
16% 9.2% 6% 4% 1.7% 
Average 
proportion 
income on 
private 
education 
30% 17.5% 12% 7% 3% 
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Source: Akyeampong 2010. 
In addition to these fiscal costs, there are “cultural costs” found in public schools that 
fail to accommodate for religious identity, according to a study by Dei and Opini (2007). 
This study found that Muslim parents may keep their children out of school to avoid 
religious indoctrination, considering the cultural cost too high. Again, private religious 
schools for a variety of students may meet the demand for maintaining traditional values. 
This question of duality regarding purpose and function of schools can often be better 
specified in private schools, rather than national public schools (MacBeth 2010, 11). 
As cost and quality are so interwoven, it is understandable that the more 
expensive urban schools would be of better quality. A recent study by Ampiah and 
Yeboah (2009) explored the influences that impact education enrollment and dropouts in 
Northern Ghana, where the educational crisis is particularly acute. The issues range from 
untrained and undercompensated teachers to the socioeconomic backgrounds of the 
populations. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds, regardless of country context, 
are usually the most vulnerable to dropping out (Nesselrodt and Alger 2005; Ampiah and 
Yeboah 2009). The Northern districts tend to be more deprived than Southern regions 
because they are largely agricultural; the majority of students there (82 percent) were 
found to drop out before junior secondary (Ampiah and Yeboah 2009, 224). The study 
also found that students in the Norther were almost one and a half times more likely to be 
absent from school, because of the unpredictable scheduling of their lives as well as 
because of their farming and household responsibilities. The findings reaffirm factors that 
already were considered known to hamper educational success and retention.  
	  	  	  	  
72	  
In Accra, Ghana’s capital, there is a stronger economic base and relatively more 
social services like quality education and healthcare accessibility. In rural areas, 
particularly in the impoverished northern regions, the population is more scattered. If 
over 70 percent of the economy in these rural regions is informal agriculture, and the 
remaining 30 percent is considered to be economically inactive, education is perceived as 
less of a prerequisite for livelihood (MacBeth 2010, 13). Moreover, child labor, poverty, 
distance from school, and poor attendance all have further negative impacts on 
educational attainment. An inapplicable national curriculum only exacerbates this reality. 
Still, little has been successfully done on a national scale to address these particularly 
vulnerable communities. Rather, corruption and school-based management have only 
worsened these already detrimental factors overall.  
According to the prediction model in Chapter 2, Ghana’s education system 
appears surprisingly successful because of its high number of years children spend in 
school. This ostensibly positive performance may be a result of its relatively long 
duration of compulsory education. Despite this performance, this Chapter showed the 
urban-rural differences to be consistently biased against the poorer, rural populations. Not 
only does schooling in the rural regions need to be more accessible for Nkrumah’s vision 
of Ghana of a developed and egalitarian state to be achieved, but the country must 
improve the intangible “software” such as teacher quality and curricula instead of merely 
building more schools. Above all, it must work harder to combat the corruption imbued 
in every level of the education system. Without improving corruption, effective 
decentralization of the school system seems near impossible. 
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Case Study 4: Education for Botswana 
Landlocked, resource-rich, and politically stable, Botswana stands in stark 
contrast to the majority of sub-Saharan Africa as a consistent over-performer in 
educational attainment. Home to approximately 2 million people—33 percent of whom 
are between the ages of ten and 24 years old—Botswana is slowly transforming itself into 
a middle-income country (Chuhan-Pole and Manka 2011, 82). This section acknowledges 
some factors that allow Botswana to be an “exception to the rule” in terms of its 
governance and its education, compared to its regional neighbors. Recognizing the 
successes its education system has achieved, this thesis further explores the role of 
nationalized curricula in impacting the urban-rural dynamic in Botswana and the 
unemployment crisis.   
 
A Series of Fortunate Events 
Botswana’s success defied the plethora of negative predictions. At the advent of 
independence, in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world, severely 
lacking infrastructure and assets. There were two secondary schools, and the overall 
quality of education was burdened with large class sizes and a high failure rate 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, 17). However, independence did not halt the evolution of 
Botswana’s political institutions, but rather allowed the country, with an initially grim 
economic and educational outlook, to establish a reliable democracy that emphasized 
investment in education, healthcare and infrastructure (Leith 2005, 54). Relatively 
untouched by corruption and political instability that roils so many African nations, 
Botswana outpaced newly industrialized “Asian Tigers” such as Korea, Thailand, and 
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Singapore at 7 percent per annum (Leith 2005, 4).  Manufacturing exports grew over 16 
percent per year from 1975 to 1999, education enrollment rates skyrocketed from 2 
percent at independence to about 87.3 percent by 2013, and one of the world’s poorest 
countries emerged as a model success story for sub-Saharan Africa (Lewin 2009; 
UNICEF 2013). 
Table 17: Botswana Education Enrollment (in thousands) 
Year 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001 
Primary 66.1 83 116 172 224 284 319 327.6 
Secondary 1.3 3.9 12.1 18.3 32.2 56.9 105 151.2* 
University 0.1 0.14 0.47 0.93 1.77 3.68 5.5 11.2* 
Sources: Leith 2005, 14. 
Note: * refers to 2000 
The combination of a relatively intact pre-colonial culture and a tradition of 
honest governance offered a foundation to soundly rebuild the country through orthodox 
economic and social policies, a privilege not granted to most African countries 
(Acemoglu et al., 2002). Alongside good governance, a significant portion of this 
country’s transformation must be accredited to its natural resources. While the presence 
of mineral wealth does not guarantee broader economic success, Botswana’s established 
redistributive institutions preceded the introduction of resources, thus allowing the 
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proceeds of Botswana’s abundant diamond mines to be evenly distributed throughout the 
country (Weldon and Russell 2014).17 Particularly noteworthy was President Seretse 
Khama’s decision to grant sub-soil mining rights to the state to avoid any tribal 
contestation for revenue. The country’s prudent monetary and fiscal policies have 
mitigated the potentially detrimental implications of the “resource curse” and have been 
heavily reinvested to score tremendous gains in the development of its education and 
healthcare sectors (Saraaf and Jiwanji 2001, 17). While diamonds fueled the bulk of 
economic growth, Botswana is bolstered by institutional strength, explaining its relative 
success in educational attainment and policy. 
Educational Policy 
The longstanding cultural values surrounding education withstood colonization, 
and a historical precedence of valuing education influenced the nascent democracy 
(Major and Tiro 2012, 64). A smooth amalgamation of traditional culture and “formal” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  “resource	  curse”	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  century	  and	  argues	  that	  resource-­‐rich	  countries,	  specifically	  non-­‐renewable	  resources,	  tend	  to	  have	  surprisingly	  poor	  economic	  growth	  and	  worse	  development	  outcomes	  than	  countries	  with	  fewer	  resources	  (Sachs	  and	  Warner	  2001;	  Auty	  2001).	  The	  logic	  follows	  that,	  with	  the	  influx	  of	  natural	  resource	  revenue,	  countries	  may	  deviate	  from	  their	  other	  industries	  and	  become	  fully	  dependent	  on	  nonrenewable	  resources.	  Since	  virtually	  every	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  country	  is	  either	  producing	  natural	  resources	  or	  searching	  for	  natural	  resources,	  this	  theory	  has	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  regions	  lack	  of	  economic	  development	  (Hertog	  2010).	  While	  the	  evidence	  accumulates,	  it	  is	  pertinent	  to	  recognize	  correlation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  causation.	  Many	  of	  these	  underperforming	  resource-­‐abundant	  regions	  are	  ridden	  with	  complex	  barriers	  to	  development,	  including	  avaricious	  leadership	  and	  difficulties	  in	  establishing	  a	  unified	  nation	  after	  colonization	  and	  building	  any	  effective	  infrastructure	  (Hertog	  2010).	  However,	  dozens	  of	  countries,	  Botswana	  included,	  have	  been	  able	  to	  escape	  this	  “paradox	  of	  plenty”	  to	  spur	  economic	  growth.	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education, as well as robust and well-implemented policy, helped Botswana achieve its 
impressive surge in enrollment rates.  
Three major reform initiatives shaped educational policy in Botswana: the 1977 
Education for Kagisano (Education for Social Harmony), the 1994 Revised National 
Policy on Education (RNPE), and the Vision 2016. Education for Kagisano—rooted in 
the four national principles of democracy, development, self-reliance, and unity—sought 
to increase the country’s human capital by increasing educational opportunity for the first 
nine years of basic education (UNESCO 2006). The RNPE built upon the former policy, 
both categorizing education as a fundamental human right and recognizing it as key for 
transforming the agriculture-based Botswana into an industrial economy. The policy was 
a significant milestone, providing a sound framework for educational planning and the 
provision of education. Its main objectives are: 
• To increase access, equity, and educational standards at all levels 
• To improve and maintain quality at all levels 
• To provide lifelong education to all sections of the population 
• To improve general education so as to prepare students more effectively for life, 
citizenship and the world of work 
• To make training more responsive to the changing needs of economic development 
by emphasizing science and technology 
• To enhance the status and performance of the teaching profession 
• To ensure effective management of the education system and maximize community 
and parental development by improving partnerships 
• To increase cost effectiveness and cost sharing in the financing of education and 
training 
• To assume control of the examination mechanism that is more effective in order to 
ensure that the broad objectives of the curriculum are realized (Government of 
Botswana).  
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The Education for Kagisano and Revised National Policy on Education policies 
culminated in the Vision 2016 Initiative, a national manifesto to celebrate fifty years of 
independence, which accentuates the respect of human rights and tolerance for all 
religions, ages, nationalities, political opinions, and genders through its seven pillars.18  
 Botswana’s education system is comprised of seven years of primary education, 
three years of junior secondary, and two years of senior secondary. The first ten years are 
genuinely free and compulsory, with the first four being taught in Setswana, and the latter 
six in English. This dual language approach allows students to feel comfortable in the 
curricula in a more familiar Setswana when introduced to English. Primary school 
receives substantial attention; the student-teacher ratio is approximately 13:1. The 
progression from primary to secondary school previously was contingent on students 
passing the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), a conditionality that recently 
was removed, although the exam is still administered. PSLE results can be found in Table 
18.19 In 2015, almost 70 percent of candidates obtained a Grade C or better, an overall 
increase in the performance of primary schools. Everyone is eligible to take this exam.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	  seven	  pillars	  of	  the	  Vision	  2016	  initiative	  are:	  an	  educated,	  informed	  nation;	  a	  united	  and	  proud	  nation;	  a	  prosperous,	  productive,	  and	  innovative	  nation;	  a	  compassionate,	  just,	  and	  caring	  nation;	  a	  safe	  and	  secure	  nation;	  an	  open,	  democratic,	  and	  accountable	  nation;	  and	  a	  moral	  and	  tolerant	  nation	  (The	  Government	  of	  Botswana	  and	  Botswana	  Vision	  2016	  Council	  2010).	  19	  The	  Primary	  School	  Leaving	  Exam	  is	  an	  annual	  examination	  that	  comprises	  seven	  mandatory	  subjects,	  including:	  English	  language	  writing,	  Setswana	  language,	  mathematics,	  agriculture,	  religious	  and	  moral	  education,	  science,	  and	  a	  social	  studies	  section.	  It	  is	  a	  national	  exam	  distributed	  by	  the	  Botswana	  Examinations	  Council	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  Skills	  Development.	  All	  segments	  of	  the	  exam	  are	  in	  English	  except	  for	  the	  Setswana	  language	  section	  (Botswana	  Examinations	  Council	  Report	  2015).	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The government strives to make primary education accessible and affordable at 
the primary level so the option for secondary at the end of compulsory education is 
available to all who are eligible. Their aims were met: from 1991 to 1997, the number of 
students eligible to move on to lower secondary increased from 65 percent to 98 percent 
(UNESCO 2010, 14). Students must pass the junior secondary examination to progress to 
upper secondary school or choose to enter into the workforce. Upper secondary school, 
usually beginning around age 15, lasts for two years and has a lower student-teacher ratio 
of 24:1, and follows a senior secondary examination, which acts as a prerequisite for 
tertiary education. An alternative to the workforce is vocational education, which 
becomes available after junior secondary education and specializes specifically in 
teaching and nursing.  
Table 18: Number of Students Who Took the PSLE Exam 
Subject 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Setswana 42,863 43,086 42,160 41,905 
English 43,583 43,775 42,797 42,553 
Mathematics 43,583 43,775 42,797 42,553 
Science 43,583 43,775 42,797 42,553 
Social Studies 43,583 43,775 42,797 42,553 
Agriculture 43,583 43,775 42,795 42,553 
Religious and Moral Education 43,538 43,723 42,754 42,508 
Total Candidature 43,583 43,775 42,797 42,553 
Source: Botswana 2015 PSLE Results Summary. 
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The examinations are made public and are used for the Education Ministry to 
constantly assess pedagogical methods and improve the quality of education. Already 
spending about 30 percent of the national budget on education, the Botswana government 
strives to have a “system of quality education that is liable to adapt to the changing needs 
of the country as a world around us” through vocational school accessibility and public-
private educational partnerships (UNESCO 2010, 2). Still, there is a need to diversify the 
curricula to better prepare students to enter the job market without a college degree. 
Recognizing this need, the Botswana Education Ministry will be launching an initiative 
to teach basic computer skills to its secondary education students (Davis et al. 2015). 
Vision 2016’s primary objectives mirror the 1994 Revised National Policy on Education 
(RNPE), which continues to guide the education sector until 2020 (Tabulawa 2009, 88).  
This policy guides the Ministry of Education in terms of curriculum reform and ongoing 
improvements until 2019, when it will be revamped again.  
Challenges for Botswana Moving Forward 
The tendency of multilateral organizations and governments to prize Botswana as 
a golden standard for education in sub-Saharan Africa can blind donors and policymakers 
from the challenges actually confronting the country. Despite the success of the country’s 
nationalized education system, it currently faces steep barriers in curricula, employment 
opportunities, and HIV/AIDS, all of which must be overcome. First, a nationalized 
curriculum, although a potential means to foster unity throughout a nation, may benefit 
specific regions more than others, discriminating against rural populations. The country’s 
nationalized school curriculum offers prescribed syllabi that leave little room for 
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relativity or contextualization and may fail to consider the prevalent socio-economic, 
climatic, and cultural idiosyncrasies across regions (Pansiri 2011). The challenges with 
this are evidenced both by PSLE results, as evidenced in Figure 3, and seasonal 
absenteeism, shown in Table 19. A recent study found a correlation that implies children 
in rural regions are more likely to drop out in certain seasons, when agricultural work is 
an obligation (Pansiri 2011, 116). 
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Source: Pansiri 2011, 74. 
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Figure	  3:	  Proportion	  of	  Candidates	  Awarded	  Grade	  A	  to	  D	  by	  District	  and	  
Town	  Council	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Table 19: Primary School Leaving Examinations: Percentage of Candidates Awarded Pass Grades A and B by District, 
2004 - 2009 
Source: Pansiri 2011, 75.
District Locality Local Language Economy 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Kgalagadi Remote, 
South Africa 
border 
Afrikans Traditional 
subsistence 
farming 
25.1 28.4 27.8 22.2 19.4 17.3 
Francistown Urban, 
Capital City 
English Working class 60.7 55.8 60.1 47.5 25.2 50.3 
Tshekedi Rural, center 
of country 
Setswana Mixed farming 
and working; 
working class 
31.8 29.6 30.9 21.4 25.1 24.5 
Gaborone Urban, capital 
city 
English Working class 59.5 55.2 58.6 51.5 52.5 49.8 
North West Rural, Zambia 
border 
Sesubiya Traditional 
farming and 
fishing 
31.8 29.6 30.9 21.4 25.1 24.5 
Gantsi Remote, 
Namibia 
border 
Sesarwa Traditional 
farming and 
hunting / gathering 
26.2 25.9 23.0 19.6 16.3 17.8 
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 The seasonal changes that contribute to absenteeism could be addressed if 
Botswana’s education policies were made on a more localized basis. Some policies, 
however, have proven quite beneficial to the country as a whole. For instance, since 
1996, the Ministry of Education has attempted to revamp curricula to focus on the 
environment, HIV/AIDS awareness, and emerging issues (UNAIDS 2013). While this 
proposal, if adequately implemented, might have been sound, some teachers did not 
receive training in these topics and therefore did not know how to incorporate them into 
the curriculum. 
Second, there is a large, unemployed, but highly educated population in the 
country because the stagnant labor markets that secondary education graduates enter into 
does not offer enough jobs commensurate with the education system. Botswana faces a 
twofold challenge: transforming an economy and transforming its workforce. The 
economic strength of Botswana rests overwhelmingly on diamonds, with mineral mining 
representing approximately one-third of the country’s GDP over the past decade. 
Although Botswana has avoided the pitfalls of the resource curse, being ranked 38th on 
the 2007 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, this lopsided 
economy is not sustainable (Hanson 2008). Attempting to diversify its economy, the 
Botswana government has focused on costly, export-oriented manufacturing, as well as 
international investments and tourism, but suffers from a comparative disadvantage given 
its close proximity to the economic powerhouse of South Africa. The lack of economic 
diversification is further hindered by its falling agricultural sector, which began to 
decrease as a portion of GDP with the introduction of diamond mining.  
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 A culture of entrepreneurship and small- and medium-sized businesses could 
prove inspiring to accelerate diversification efforts, and could expand with vocational 
training programs, but this transformation may take too long. Since mining and 
governments so heavily dominate Botswana’s economy, a 2007 International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) report recommended a bureaucratic reduction combined with labor market 
reform in order to attract foreign investors (International Monetary Fund 2007, 32). 
Ideally, these two recommendations would address the slow economic diversification and 
unemployment to transform the economy, but fail to address the unavoidable steep 
economic barriers facing the country from success—specifically that it is a country rife 
with HIV/AIDS, that relies on South Africa for many of its imported goods (Hanson 
2008).  
The Botswana government does recognize its eroding international 
competitiveness, and has responded by emphatically spending on education. Education is 
deemed synonymous with success in the Botswana, but the surplus of skilled and 
educated workers has not been met with large labor market demand. To qualify for an 
entry-level job requires higher qualifications than secondary and tertiary education can 
provide. Students, therefore, face “the predicament of being overqualified for some jobs 
and underqualified for others” (Hanson 2008). Students do not want to take the low-skill 
positions, such as those in construction and domestic help—a reality that has led to an 
influx of Zimbabwean migrants coming to Botswana searching for employment. 
Nevertheless, there is an evident lag time in response to the “white collar” job creation, 
leaving Botswana graduates unemployed. 
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 Additionally, the country has been tragically burdened with having the third 
highest HIV/AIDS prevalence in the world, with 21.9 percent of adults suffering from the 
disease (UNAIDS 2013). While it is a huge undertaking for the government to sustain 
prevention and treatment programs to fight it, the country provides universal, free 
antiretroviral treatment for those living with HIV, significantly decreasing new infections 
and AIDS-related deaths. Botswana’s progress is impressive, but its prevention efforts 
need to be scaled up to support the most vulnerable populations—specifically young 
people, female sex workers, and homosexual men. Still, funding proves to be one of 
Botswana’s greatest challenges in responding to the HIV epidemic. As the country joins 
the ranks of middle-income countries, international funding has diminished, since now 
donors redirect their support to low-income countries. This decrease in funding, 
combined with a relatively stagnant economy, may imply that Botswana cannot afford to 
offer its tremendous welfare in the future. Providing and improving free welfare is 
dependent on extensive international funding and the mining industry, both of which are 
not sustainable. Botswana must establish a stronger, more diversified and entrepreneurial 
economy for its educated populations if it hopes to continue providing these much-
needed welfare programs and free services. 
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Chapter 4: Opportunities for Reform 
Despite an international commitment toward increasing universal enrollment rates 
in sub-Saharan Africa, debilitating problems stymie progress—as outlined in the above 
case studies. While these problems are distinct to each country, they can be representative 
of larger issues facing educational advancement throughout the continent.  
In order to move forward, future policy must acknowledge the urban-rural reality. 
Otherwise, policy makers are at risk of the pitfall of wishful thinking, not to mention 
political rhetoric. Students in rural communities are less likely to progress to secondary 
education as they suffer from overcrowded, underfunded classrooms and often face 
pressure to commit to agricultural and domestic work. More qualified teachers are often 
discouraged from working in rural areas, and disenchanted parents may be unwilling to 
invest their children’s time in school when there is little obvious reward. Yet it is in these 
rural areas that the majority of the sub-Saharan African population lives. Decent 
education for all cannot be accomplished without allowing for the specific idiosyncrasies 
found in each country’s rural populations. In order to accomplish more equitable and 
accessible educational opportunities, this thesis recommends that education policy in the 
region focus on: 
1. Reallocating funds to be more applicable in the education infrastructure  
2. Improving teacher-training programs and offering teachers incentives to work in 
disadvantaged areas 
3. Creating a flexible, relevant curriculum  
4. Establishing cash transfer programs to encourage households to send their children to 
school 
5. Improving long-term improvements in employment opportunities to motivate families 
and individuals to invest in education. 
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While these institutional improvements will not address every issue that hampers 
success in education, such as the ubiquitous spread of HIV/AIDS, they promote a 
realistic vision of what countries can work toward in order to provide an equitable 
educational experience for all of its citizens. 
Financing Education 
Sub-Saharan African countries currently allocate about 18.3 percent of their 
public resources to the education sector (UNESCO 2011), but as this thesis shows, the 
amount of spending does not necessarily correlate with success. The robust growth in 
education spending must be met with appropriate policy and curricular reform to ensure 
equitable quantitative and qualitative improvements. This can begin by focusing 
expenditure on developing the primary school systems, rather than by focusing on the 
tertiary education system. 
Currently, expenditure per tertiary student is at least ten times greater than for 
primary students. Primary school, on the other hand, has seen such a huge surge in 
enrollment that the expenditure per student has decreased relative to GDP in most 
countries in the region. The lack of funding degrades the quality of the education 
received. Table 20 shows the drop in student-teacher ratio once a student gets to 
secondary and upper secondary education, one determinant of learning quality. Poor 
education at the primary school bars students from progressing onto secondary school 
and can deny them the educational opportunities to which the government states they are 
entitled. While higher levels of education are usually matched with higher spending in 
general, the inequity of resource allocation that bars majorities from entering upper levels 
of education must be addressed (UNESCO 2011). Until the governments in sub-Saharan 
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Africa reallocate funding to benefit the retention rates of primary education, only a 
limited proportion of students will enjoy the large benefits from public resources—
widening the educational achievement gaps. 
Table 20: Student-Teacher Ratio (Headcount Basis) 
Country Primary Lower Secondary Upper Secondary 
Angola (2011) 42.54306 33.27119 20.50581 
Benin (2014) 45.92349 11.01843 7.69833 
Botswana (2013) 22.61822 .. .. 
Burkina Faso (2014; 2009; 2009) 44.49899 30.02287 16.0522 
Burundi (2014) 43.65376 42.50685 26.20684 
Cameroon (2014; 2013) 44.19526 19.73618 19.26365 
Cape Verde (2014) 22.60472 16.60772 15.28372 
Central African Republic (2012) 80.11576 .. .. 
Chad (2013; 2012) 62.42763 41.55428 17.82284 
Eritrea (2013) 40.28249 39.8274 36.77113 
Ethiopia (2014; 2012; 2012) 64.27288 43.34925 20.99876 
Gambia (2014) 36.83534 27.70799 .. 
Ghana (2015; 2014; 2015) 31.25587 15.3958 19.50429 
Guinea (2014; 2011; 2010) 44.64329 37.0465 26.66493 
Guinea-Bissau (2010) 51.92515 .. .. 
Kenya (2012) 56.5747 56.57381 32.30515 
Lesotho (2014) 32.77944 .. .. 
Liberia (2014) 26.49841 13.75804 17.2592 
Malawi (2014) 61.38905 .. .. 
Mali (2014) 42.47449 29.54108 10.83247 
Mozambique (2014; 2013) 54.48858 33.89333 23.91423 
Namibia (2010) 29.77842 .. .. 
Rwanda (2013; 2009;2009) 59.81633 22.59902 22.61891 
Senegal (2014; 2008; 2004) 31.58513 34.78689 25.1471 
Seychelles (2014; 2002) 12.55271 .. 13.07451 
Sierra Leone (2013) 34.83163 19.83891 22.50521 
Somalia (2007) 35.51919 17.89063 20.68412 
South Africa (2013) 32.02921 .. .. 
Sudan (pre-secession) (2009) 38.37542 28.01127 17.37581 
Swaziland (2013; 2012; 2003) 28.09674 .. 12.55396 
Togo (2014; 2011; 2011) 41.13664 33.93276 16.20854 
Uganda (2013; 2006; 2006) 45.59109 19.01322 18.01159 
Zambia (2013) 47.94526 47.94506 … 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics Database 2016.  
Note: “..” means the data is unavailable. 
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Because funding at these lower levels of schooling often involves 
decentralization, sound infrastructure to monitor corruption should be in place. In the 
case of Ghana, where corruption is accepted as a norm in many rural areas, it is difficult 
to monitor the school districts and confirm proper allocation. If financing the rural 
schools instead focuses on tangible aspects, such as teachers and classroom materials, it 
may alleviate some corruption along with more monitoring of implementation. 
One helpful example of a country with good infrastructure is Botswana. In its 
monitoring of corruption over the past 50 years, Botswana has exposed corruption 
scandals and dissuaded others through effective punishments via the Corruption and 
Economic Crime Act of 1994. In fact, in the public schools, this fight against corruption 
has manifested itself into a popular campaign with a cartoon superhero in the form of a 
cartoon cow named Rre Boammaruri (“Mr. Honesty”), whose purpose is to instill ethical 
values at the primary school age about how to avoid corruption (Director on Corruption 
and Economic Crime) (see Appendix: Figure 4). 
Responsibly financing and monitoring the school systems at the primary level is 
critical for establishing a quality education system. However, a budget must also focus on 
sustainable benefits for the students and classrooms.  Instead of investing in the One 
Laptop per Child ed-tech initiative, Rwanda could have reallocated that money into its 
teacher-training programs or textbooks. This reform relies on governments consciously 
investing in long-term programs, such as teacher-training, instead of flashy superficial, 
publicity-seeking initiatives that are intended to be more attractive to international aid 
organizations and multilateral donors. 
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Teacher-Training Programs 
 Providing more resources to more classrooms will not be impactful if it is not met 
with an increase in qualified, trained teachers. The dearth of adequately trained teachers, 
as seen in Table 21, is almost always more prescient at the primary level than at higher 
levels of schooling. Moreover, the issue of qualification proves particularly acute in rural 
areas, where overcrowded classrooms and inadequate resources make it is substantially 
less appealing to teach. A 2010 review of unqualified primary teachers in Tanzania, 
Malawi, and Nigeria, found the increasing demand for primary education has led to the 
hiring of unqualified teachers (Kruijer 2010) —in fact, the increase of unqualified, 
unenthused teachers has undermined the teaching profession as a whole in these 
countries. Moreover, these underprepared teachers are likely to be detrimental to their 
student’s overall learning experience. Because qualified teachers tend to be largely 
concentrated in urban areas, the atmosphere of teacher absenteeism and tardiness in 
unprepared teachers further entrenches the urban-rural educational disparity (Nordstrum 
2015, 26).  
The urban-rural gap in teacher quality calls for an increase in the number of 
qualified teachers all around, but also emphasizes the need to encourage teachers to work 
in remote areas. Thus, the opportunity to invest more heavily in teacher-training 
programs is important. Currently, teacher-training institutions frequently lack the 
capacity to provide future teachers with “high-quality” training, making them less 
capable of implementing good learning practices and instead more likely to have a poor 
attitude about their profession (Nordstrum, 2015). 
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Table 21: Percent of Teachers Who Are Adequately Trained 
Country Primary Education 
Lower 
Secondary 
Upper 
Secondary 
Angola (2011) 47.48642 .. .. 
Benin (2014) 67.59375 .. .. 
Botswana (2013) 98.63651 100 100 
Burkina Faso (2013; 2009) 85.58639 93.82239 58.40979 
Burundi (2014) 92.15134 .. 100 
Cameroon (2012; 2013) 78.77751 100 100 
Cape Verde (2014) 96.02024 100 100 
Central African Republic (2012) 57.91702 .. .. 
Chad (2013) 64.98018 .. .. 
Congo (2012) 80.31706 58.75 .. 
Côte d'Ivoire (2012) 84.94438 .. .. 
Democratic Republic Congo (2014) 94.62353 .. .. 
Eritrea (2014; 2013) 79.86175 .. .. 
Ethiopia (2013; 2012) 95 100 100 
Gambia (2014) 84.1104 .. .. 
Ghana (2015) 54.69452 81.71151 82.08955 
Guinea (2014; 2008) 75.00395 68.47826 62.5 
Guinea-Bissau (2010) 38.9313 .. .. 
Kenya (2009) 96.80731 .. .. 
Lesotho (2014) 75.7858 100 .. 
Liberia (2014) 56.3885 .. .. 
Madagascar (2014) 16.66275 .. .. 
Malawi (2013) 90.80983 100 100 
Mali (2011) 52.42385 .. .. 
Mauritius (2014) 100 87.39407 90.86294 
Mozambique (2014) 89.95685 43.77593 36.73469 
Namibia (2010) 96.38881 .. .. 
Rwanda (2013) 95.20406 .. .. 
Sao Tome and Principe (2012) 34.35115 .. .. 
Senegal (2014) 69.96822 26.89538 48.8498 
Seychelles (2014) 23.64672 92.85714 .. 
Sierra Leone (2013) 57.11606 .. .. 
Swaziland (2013) 79.14659 64.18871 49.59184 
Togo (2013) 76.06691 58.33108 42.23539 
Zambia (2012) 92.65586 100 100 
Zimbabwe (2012) 88.15413 .. .. 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2016.  
Note: “..” means the data is unavailable. 
  
	  	  
92	  
92	  
Table 22: Teacher Pay By Level of Schooling Expressed as a Proportion of GDP per 
Capita 
Country Primary Lower Secondary Upper 
Secondary 
Angola (2003) 1.5 … … 
Benin (2010) 5.0 5.5 9.9 
Burkina Faso (2007) 5.9 8.8 9.6 
Cameroon (2011) 2.7 2.5 6.9 
Cape Verde (2009) 2.4 2.7 2.9 
CAR (2008) 3.3 6.5 6.7 
Chad (2003) 5.4 8.8 9.8 
Congo (2007) 0.9 2.0 2.5 
Cote d d'Ivoire (2007) 4.9 8.8 9.4 
DRC (2005) 3.9 2.4 2.4 
Eritrea (2003) 7.7 … … 
Gambia (2009) 2.5 2.8 3.0 
Ghana (2007) 4.7 4.7 4.8 
Guinea (2005) 1.7 2.9 2.9 
Guinea-Bissau (2010) 2.3 3.4 3.4 
Kenya (2004) 5.3 7.6 7.6 
Lesotho (2004) 5.0 10. 10.4 
Liberia (2008) 3.0 3.1 3.3 
Madagascar (2008) 2.3 5.1 8.1 
Malawi (2008) 6.3 11.6 11.6 
Mali (2008) 4.2 5.6 6.6 
Mozambique (2003) 4.0 13.1 32.9 
Niger (2008) 6.6 7.4 8.6 
Nigeria (2003) 4.9 … … 
Rwanda (2008) 2.6 6.4 7.3 
Sao Tome & Principe (2010) 1.5 2.9 2.9 
Senegal (2004) 4.7 5.5 6.6 
Seychelles (2010) 1.7 … 3.6 
Sierra Leone (2010) 2.4 3.4 5.9 
Sudan (2009) 2.2 2.6 2.6 
Togo (2011) 4.5 8.1 8.6 
Uganda (2011) 3.3 4.1 5.8 
Zambia (2007) 1.5 … … 
Zimbabwe (2003) 6.1 … … 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2011. 
Note: “..” means the data is unavailable. 
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Another issue with teacher-training programs is the curriculum. In many 
countries, the content of these programs is passive, theoretical, and lecture based, often 
failing to relate to the actual classroom setting. Lee Nordstrum conducted a study (2015) 
that focused on the influence of teacher-training programs, given the rapid increase in 
enrollment rates in Ethiopia and Tanzania between 2000 and 2010. Ethiopia met the new 
education demands by hiring unqualified teachers, while Tanzania was successful in 
training a higher proportion of new teachers but failed to keep pace with the rapid 
enrollment rates. Thus, while the classrooms were still overcrowded and teachers in short 
supply, the urban-rural disparity of qualified teachers was less stark in Tanzania than in 
Ethiopia.  
Adding to the ensuring shortage of qualified teachers were financial constraints: 
in Ethiopia less than one third of the budget for the teacher-training programs in 2010 
was used; in Tanzania, only 55 percent of the budget was properly allocated to the 
training program. The remaining 45 percent of Tanzania’s teacher-training budget was 
allocated for administrative purposes, meals, and travel. There is clearly opportunity for 
non-residential training programs — which, importantly, incur significantly fewer cost —
to be explored as a model.  
In Kenya, “distance learning” is offered for unqualified, already practicing 
teachers to enroll in a six-month program to acquire proper certification (Nordstrum 
2015). This teacher-training program has proven to be quite intensive, but again the 
extensive growth has not fully accommodated the increasing student-teacher ratio. For 
university students hoping to become teachers, different levels of qualifications have 
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been established, depending on the education level an aspiring instructor plans to teach. 
Kenyan primary school teachers go through a two-year teacher program and secondary 
teachers go through a three- to four-year program. While student-teacher ratios in the 
country still are quite high—as of 2009, student-teacher ratios averaged 47:1 for primary 
schools and 30:1 for secondary schools (Nordstrum 2015)—this policy will likely prove 
beneficial in the long run and explains why their school system has done relatively well 
in educational achievement. “Distance learning” may address the financial constraints 
facing teacher-training programs and could result in employing more qualified teachers. 
Then, the challenge for education policy will become implementing new policies and 
curricula at a pace that can keep up with demand. 
The varying levels of certification complicate the cross-country analysis. Teachers 
in Ghana are only required to attain teacher education certification, meaning that no 
renewing or reapplying for a teaching license is expected. Students who graduate 
secondary school can enroll in one of Ghana’s 41 colleges for a Diploma in Basic 
Education, and are then qualified to teach at the primary and junior secondary level. In 
hopes of improving untrained teachers, Ghana has employed “distance education” 
(Ghana Education Service 2012) that serves to quickly train more teachers in rural 
regions. The training programs are now more career-oriented, based on professional 
accomplishments in the classrooms. 
In South Africa, it is mandatory to register with the South African Council for 
Educators to ensure that teachers are qualified. To be eligible for a teacher-training 
program, potential teachers must already have obtained a bachelor’s degree. This is a 
time-consuming process with little tangible reward. The large class sizes and lack of 
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materials in both urban and rural schools have encouraged qualified teachers to seek 
employment in private, often religious-affiliated schools that do not tend to pay as much 
as public institutions. The spike in private education indicates that this tradeoff is 
reasonable for potential teachers. 
Table 23: Teacher Attrition Rate 
Country Teacher Attrition Rate 
Angola (2010) 16.65302 
Benin (2013) 8.73637 
Botswana (2007) 3.56171 
Burkina Faso (2013) 5.57837 
Burundi (2013)  1.72167 
Cameroon (2011)  2.57007 
Cape Verde (2013)  3.00239 
Chad (2011)  3.59568 
Côte d'Ivoire (2013)  7.28559 
Eritrea (2010) 10.25641 
Ghana (2012) 13.44612 
Guinea (2013) 6.78501 
Lesotho (2012) 3.28901 
Malawi (2010) 10.06235 
Mali (2010) 7.36715 
Namibia (2010)  7.20443 
Rwanda (2012) 4.11584 
Senegal (2011) 4.63237 
Seychelles (2011) 11.23245 
South Africa (2013) 4.15011 
Togo (2014) 15.23981 
Uganda (2011) 1.22896 
United Republic of Tanzania (2010) 7.15361 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016. 
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While South Africa’s teachers’ unions have worked as major actors to negotiate 
benefits for teachers, such as higher pay and a system of remuneration that is tied 
between performance and pay, the public school teaching positions are not proving 
appealing, and have led to a relatively high attrition rate for its level of spending (see 
Table 23). The entrenched disparity in schools may lead to quality teachers working in 
higher performing, wealthier schools, and further discourages teachers from wanting to 
work in low-income school districts. If remunerations were established by performance 
adjusted by locality and school, quality teachers may be more inclined to work in more 
challenging school environments. Ideally, these payments would outweigh the 
nonmonetary benefits teachers receive at private schools. 
The cycle of teacher-training in education (students become teachers who teach 
students who then become teachers) underlines the significance of investing in quality 
teacher-training programs. Moreover, the teachers themselves must be encouraged to 
demonstrate good performance in the classroom, as well as an overall intrinsic motivation 
to improve. One study (Kremer et al. 2005) found that fixed salaries that do not 
differentiate by performance both undermine job satisfaction and increase teacher 
absenteeism. If qualified teachers are offered adequate compensation reflective of their 
performance, then overall intrinsic motivation will improve. This concept has inspired the 
government of Guinea to establish a pilot program for third and fourth grade teachers in 
420 schools that reward teachers at different levels. Based on student performance, 
surveys, and evaluations, teachers are eligible to “win” (from lowest prize to highest): 
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1. One bag of rice and a radio or a bronze certificate and community ceremony 
2. One bag of rice, a radio, and a cell phone, OR a silver certificate and community and 
prefectural ceremonies 
3. One bag of rice, a radio, a cellphone and a television, OR a gold certificate and 
community, prefectural, and regional ceremonies 
4. One bag of rice, a radio, a cellphone, a television and a generator, OR a platinum 
certificate, and community, prefectural, regional, and national ceremonies (The 
World Bank 2014). 
 
The initiative is an exciting opportunity for a country with one of the lowest 
primary school enrollments in the world. The program is still in process, but has already 
seen success in enrollment and student outcomes. It also has the opportunity to shift a 
general cultural viewpoint that will enable teachers to be more respected. Depending 
solely on student outcomes is best when considered on a regional scale rather than a 
national one. Certain poorer and rural areas are already at a disadvantage, which makes 
them much more unfit to compete against their urban counterparts. Nevertheless, 
Guinea’s pilot program provides an exciting model moving forward for other countries’ 
Ministries of Education.  
Creating education policy that improves teacher-training programs is the first step 
to ensuring a quality education for students everywhere. Establishing an incentive scheme 
to encourage qualified teachers to work in more rural areas, both through monetary and 
nonmonetary compensation, could act as the first step toward better basic education in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
Reconstructing Curriculum  
Alongside misallocations of funds and poor teacher quality, the case studies found 
inflexible nationalized curricula hinder educational achievement, especially impacting 
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rural communities.  Given the ethnic and geographical heterogeneity of most sub-Saharan 
African countries, a unified curriculum, while building nationalist pride, may not be 
practical for all students. Education plays a particularly complex role as a unifying 
instrument in South Africa and Rwanda, but also has exacerbated racial and ethnic 
inequalities through socioeconomic status.  
The South Africa and Ghana cases prove the importance of practical and 
applicable curricula for a successful education system. Rote memorization, compounded 
with a burdensome theoretical focus, rarely fosters critical thinking abilities that are 
essential for innovation, nor does this style of formal education have anything practical to 
do with the needs of rural communities. As seen in Botswana, students in rural regions 
are more likely to drop out when agricultural obligations coincide. The school curriculum 
and calendar could take the diverse economies, from subsistence farming to fishing to 
urban work, into consideration to be more accessible for all students. If educational 
policy was better localized and funding reliably monitored, parents could be more 
reassured that the benefits of school outweigh the benefits of their child labor. Teacher-
training and curriculum must be linked to specific characteristics of rural schools to apply 
to real-life rural situations, such as farming, fishing, or animal husbandry.  
The “cultural cost” of education, as exemplified in Ghana, also needs to be taken 
into consideration when employing curricula. Formal schooling is more likely to be at 
odds with prevailing religious or cultural practices in many rural areas if a national 
curriculum is inflexible. By granting more regional autonomy in the curriculum, teachers 
and parents can work together to establish a practical education for its students. 
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Language policy is another fundamental factor for ensuring that a country’s 
curriculum is relevant and accessible to all. National curricula tend to encourage one 
national language, despite the two thousand living languages spoken in sub-Saharan 
Africa (UNESCO 2010). While ostensibly intended to foster a sense of shared identity, 
the “unifying initiative” can, in fact, fuel violence or resentment of the people speaking 
minority languages. Language policy has continued to be a problem in Rwanda, where 
Kinyarwanda is phased out early in primary school and replaced with English, taught by 
teachers who predominantly speak French. Ideally, language policy can be a blend of the 
local language and the country’s national language, so students unfamiliar with the 
language are not immediately at a disadvantage in the classroom. In the Rwandan case, 
transitioning from French to English as a national language benefitted the Tutsi elite, but 
focusing more on the mother tongue, Kinyarwanda, would be more logical for the general 
public. Linguistic diversity does represent a challenge for education systems, but also a 
unique opportunity.  
Nigeria has addressed language policy by requiring that teachers can speak the 
local language in a given region, preferably by someone from the immediate local area 
(Adedej and Olanrewaju 2011). Another approach was seen in Tanzania, where Kiswahili 
was deemed an “ethnically neutral” language that can be implemented as a support to 
form a unified identity, without allowing one ethnic group to dominate (Adedej and 
Olanrewaju 2011). This is starkly different from Rwanda’s English or French policy 
because those languages carry ethnic overtones in a divided nation. Ethiopia, in 
recognizing that the degree of alignment between home and school language critically 
affects learning, has established a well-designed bilingual program to help prevent any 
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confusion for its students (UNESCO 2015). These multilingual approaches, of course, 
can prove difficult in specific situations. For instance, Senegal has six national languages, 
and schools are expected to instruct each student in one of the local languages. The 
expectation that every teacher can be multilingual can be challenging, but the policy as a 
concept is moving in the right, equitable direction. As local language becomes more 
celebrated and used in the classroom, programs such as these should be executed 
throughout the region.  
Private schools may be able to accommodate households if public schools fail to 
do address the diverse cultural and linguistic characteristics of their population. However, 
such accommodations found in private school may require rural families to invest in 
more expensive schools, a burden that could potentially discourage households from 
education all together. A common language of instruction, while an asset for nation 
building, must be balanced with the cultural and local languages in order to enable 
educational access for minority groups. 
Lowering the Cost of Education 
Even with an appropriate curriculum and quality teachers, the cost of sending a 
child to school is high, both in the literal sense and in terms of opportunity cost. From 
PTAs that distribute and supplement funds in South Africa to the supplemental “hidden” 
costs of education in Ghana, it is clear that the “fee-free” policies that have spread across 
sub-Saharan Africa are nearly symbolic. The great attraction of private education is its 
reputation for higher quality; however, private schools are exclusive and expensive. In 
fact, in rural Rwanda, private schools are so costly that they have been forced to shut 
their doors, so it is not even an option for these students. Schools that are able to charge 
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fees should continue to do so, but rural schools that are already at a disadvantage should 
be given higher government grants.  
 To further help households that are burdened by the cost of education, there is the 
opportunity for conditional cash transfer programs that require school attendance. 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) condition payments on activities—such as health 
checkups or school attendance—and are widely believed to be beneficial in alleviating 
the short- and long-term dimensions of poverty. Ideally, the cash transfers would over-
compensate parents for the cost of sending their child to school, in lieu of the profit they 
could make working at home or in the fields.  
CCT programs have been thoroughly studied and overwhelming evidence 
suggests they are generally successful as a multifaceted pro-poor policy for raising 
enrollment and attendance rates (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Hailu and Soares 2008). 
Conditions can range from attending 70 percent of school days in a month to 95 percent 
in a month, sometimes requiring parent-teacher conferences. Some increases in 
enrollment have been modest. In Malawi, CCT programs targeted households with 
children and yielded an increase in enrollment by five percent for children aged six to 17 
(Hailu and Soares 2008).  
 Yet other programs in sub-Saharan Africa have made impressive improvements, 
boasting enrollment rates increasing 18 percent (Hailu and Soares 2008). South Africa’s 
Child Support Grant has targeted the recipients of the cash transfers to the children, 
irrespective of their household arrangement. The program was introduced in 1998 to 
cover children below the age of seven, but expanded in 2003 to cover children below the 
age of fourteen (Barrientos and DeJong 2006). A 2012 UNICEF report found children 
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who were enrolled in the program exhibited significantly higher scores on math and 
reading tests as well as attainment. For children whose mothers did not complete primary 
school, the impacts were greater: “Early enrollment in the [program] raises grade 
attainment by 10.2 percent (0.38 grades)” (UNICEF 2012, 54). This study also found a 
strong correlation between earlier receipts of the program and school attainment. 
 Despite its successful results, the initiative has been unsuccessful in administering 
the grant to all children enrolled in schools. While this kind of Child Support Grant 
recognizes the rights of poor children, orphans, and child-headed households, it requires 
an adult to apply for and collect the grant (Barrientos and DeJong 2006). Another 
criticism is that the grant amount is too small in value to cover the basic costs of 
education and childcare (de La Brière and Rawlings 2006; Bastagli 2010). Regardless of 
bureaucratic challenges, CCTs overall appear as an effective tool in reducing poverty in 
the short and long term (Kakwani et al. 2005). 
The high costs of administering conditional cash transfer programs, as well as the 
difficulties in targeting and monitoring these them, must not be overlooked. Transferring 
the money in a timely manner to those who meet the conditions is essential for the 
validity of the program, but sub-Saharan Africa’s infrastructural barriers make this task 
daunting (Caldés et al. 2006). That said, sub-Saharan Africa has been able to enjoy 
technological advancements regarding cellphones and mobile money that can make quick 
and reliable payments much easier. Still, these enhancing incentives will prove futile if 
the other factors inhibiting households from sending their children to school are not 
accounted for. For example, it will not matter if a cash transfer program is effectively 
managed if a school is not within a reasonable distance of a community. Thus, there is a 
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need for governments to commit to education by committing to infrastructural 
development alongside classroom quality and CCT initiatives. Given the positive impact 
of educational attainment on sub-Saharan Africa’s development, the expected long term 
return on this investment is worthwhile. 
Improving Employment Opportunities for Graduates 
Assuming the barriers of quality, accessibility, and financial feasibility are all 
overcome, the return on education is reliant on a promising job market upon graduation. 
Indeed, in Botswana, where the issues facing the education system are relatively less 
grim in comparison to its neighbors, unemployment is still remarkably high. Students 
who graduate from secondary and tertiary schools are less willing to fill low-skill 
positions; however, many firms are unwilling to train the graduates to be qualified for 
higher-skilled jobs. The overall demand for high-skilled labor is present and the supply of 
undergraduates is increasing, but the supply of skilled and qualified workers is 
insufficient. Countries like Botswana must diversify their economies to provide jobs for 
students after education.   
Often, developing countries are keen solely to pursue industrialization as essential 
to modernization; however, this assumption does not always prove true. Sub-Saharan 
African countries should look to create an environment for innovation and trade. This 
involves establishing sensible liberalizing economic policies that could reduce regulation, 
licensing requirements, and to encouraging diversification. The World Bank’s annual 
“Doing Business” report ranks different countries to determine the “ease of doing 
business,” and analyzes each country’s reform trends. Economies in sub-Saharan Africa 
currently have an average ranking of 143 out of 189 on the ease of doing business scale. 
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Table 22 shows the rankings, with Mauritius (32), Rwanda (62), Botswana (72), and 
South Africa (73) ranking the highest in the region, and Eritrea (189), South Sudan (187), 
and Central African Republic (185) ranking lowest.  
Rwanda has implemented the most reforms in the region to improve its economy, 
including a credit scoring service that supports the ability of banks to access the 
creditworthiness of potential borrowers (World Bank 2016). The country must work to 
encourage innovation within its own populations as well, and constantly reaffirm that the 
markets are demanding what the schools produce.  
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Table 24: Ease of Doing Business Rankings Data for sub-Saharan Africa 
Economy Rank (1-189)  Reforms  
 DB 2015 DB 2016  DB 2015 DB 2016 
Angola 183 181 0 2 
Benin 1162 158 4 3 
Burkina Faso 149 143 1 1 
Burundi 151 152 0 0 
Cabo Verde 124 126 1 1 
Cameroon 168 172 2 0 
CAR 185 185 1 0 
Chad 182 183 1 1 
DR Congo 187 184 5 2 
Côte d’Ivoire 145 142 5 3 
Equatorial Guinea 178 180 1 0 
Eritrea 189 189 0 0 
Ethiopia 148 143 0 0 
Gabon 156 162 2 2 
Gambia, The 150 151 2 1 
Ghana 112 114 2 1 
Guinea 171 165 2 1 
Kenya 129 108 1 4 
Lesotho 110 114 0 1 
Liberia 180 179 0 1 
Madagascar 166 164 1 4 
Malawi 144 141 2 0 
Mali 142 143 2 2 
Mauritania 176 168 2 3 
Mauritius 31 32 2 1 
Mozambique 128 133 2 1 
Namibia 101 101 0 1 
Rwanda 55 62 3 6 
Senegal 156 153 6 4 
Seychelles 104 95 3 1 
Sierra Leone 147 147 3 0 
South Africa 69 73 1 0 
South Sudan 186 187 0  0 
Sudan 158 159 0 0 
Swaziland 102 105 2 1 
Tanzania 140 139 2 1 
Togo 152 150 4 3 
Uganda 135 122 2 3 
Zambia 91 97 2 2 
Zimbabwe 153 155 0 2 
Source: World Bank Doing Business Database 
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Despite its impressive performance on this ranking, Rwanda still faces the issue 
of high unemployment for educated secondary school leavers and graduates. Indeed, the 
unemployment rate is expected to be much higher than the reported 7 percent in urban 
areas and 2 percent in rural (UNDP 2012).20 Internship programs are common for 
graduates to develop transferrable, employable skills, but employment is not guaranteed, 
as there is a lack of actual job opportunity. Foreign labor has, instead, been accused of 
filling the labor market, claiming that Rwandan universities do not train their students 
effectively for the realities of the existing labor market. Rwanda has tried to address this 
through instigating a reemergence of Vocational Education and Training (VET) 
programs. Numerous attempts to expand vocational schooling in sub-Saharan Africa 
failed from the 1960s to early 1990s because the many countries had the public sector 
often offering jobs without demanding basic skills to the upper echelons. As there has 
been a general reduction in the public sector job market, many Sub-Saharan countries 
have turned to formally institutionalizing VET program that run in parallel to general 
education (King 2013).21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The	  Rwandan	  government	  determines	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  in	  their	  Housing	  and	  Population	  Census.	  Anyone	  who	  had	  been	  looking	  for	  work	  in	  the	  seven-­‐day	  time	  frame	  that	  the	  census	  occurs	  is	  considered	  unemployed.	  Most	  people	  are	  involved	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  agricultural	  work,	  but	  would	  prefer	  a	  job	  on	  top	  of	  that.	  The	  unemployment	  figure	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  this.	  Additionally,	  people	  may	  be	  self-­‐employed	  or	  part	  time	  workers	  and,	  while	  maybe	  only	  working	  15	  hours	  per	  week,	  are	  still	  considered	  employed	  (Saba	  2015).	  21	  In	  1997	  UNESCO	  segmented	  secondary	  education	  into	  three	  categories:	  general	  education,	  pre-­‐vocational,	  and	  vocational.	  While	  general	  education	  is	  mainly	  geared	  to	  prepare	  students	  for	  additional	  education	  and	  follows	  more	  traditional	  pedagogy,	  both	  pre-­‐vocational	  and	  vocational	  education	  are	  mainly	  designed	  to	  prepare	  students	  for	  a	  particular	  occupation	  or	  trade.	  It	  offers	  participants	  the	  opportunity	  to	  acquire	  and	  develop	  more	  practical	  skills	  and	  “know-­‐how”	  (Holsinger	  and	  Cowell	  2000).	  
	  	  
107	  
107	  
While enrollment rates in these VET programs vary greatly by region, most are 
around five percent or less (UNESCO 2011), making Rwanda stand out as a model with 
its 30 percent enrollment. The overall low enrollment rates are partially due to limited 
institutional support, a stigma that vocational schooling is an inferior alternative to 
general secondary schooling, and a concern that it will not provide adequate training to 
gain sufficient access to employment (Eichhorst 2012, 9).22 Nevertheless, there is a 
growing interest in these schools. For instance, in Rwanda, VET programs run in tandem 
with secondary education, focusing on occupations that are beneficial for urban planning 
and development. There is a clear opportunity for these same schools to focus on 
agricultural practices, small business ownership, and micro-enterprises for rural 
communities. In Senegal, Benin, and Nigeria, UNESCO led VET initiatives have proven 
successful by developing a common format for curricula and learning materials 
(UNESCO 2011). Keeping VET programs prominent on the political agenda can help 
ensure economic mobility and educational opportunity moving forward. 
As with sub-Saharan Africa’s historical, political, educational, cultural, and 
economic characteristics, the VET structure largely varies in structure and outcome 
among countries. They were initially modeled after the colonizing countries, so VET 
programs in sub-Saharan Africa showed different purposes depending on whether a 
country was Francophone or Anglophone. Francophone countries have tended to have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  The	  Rhodesian	  Front	  government	  established	  ‘F2’	  schools	  in	  Zimbabwe	  which	  provided	  over	  37	  percent	  of	  students	  with	  basic	  vocational	  training.	  During	  this	  time	  it	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  alternative	  for	  those	  unable	  to	  attain	  formal	  education.	  After	  independence	  it	  was	  abolished	  and,	  in	  its	  recent	  reestablishment,	  there	  remains	  a	  negative	  cultural	  stigma	  attached	  to	  craft-­‐based	  technical	  education	  (Shizha	  and	  Kariwo	  2011,	  80).	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less effective program with the training relationship poorly transferring to the job 
opportunities available. Anglophone countries, on the other hand, focus more attention to 
skill development and employment opportunity in the informal sector, promoting 
entrepreneurship and self-employment training. This outcome-based system, while 
arguably stronger than the Francophone methodology, has yet to produce the desired 
results in improving employment rates in sub-Saharan Africa because governments have 
not invested in it. One reason for this underwhelming productivity of these programs may 
be because VET courses often fail to account for artisans’ micro-enterprises and 
apprenticeships in the informal economy (Eichhorst et al. 2012). Research by Fares and 
Puerto (2009) found that of the 23 vocational training centers in rural Tanzania, only 
three focused on the agriculture sector; in Malawi, where 90 percent of the population is 
pastoralist and agriculture makes up 36 percent of GDP, the agriculture sector is 
completely excluded from the VET curriculum (Valle 2012). A general focus on theory 
and lessons can limit the VET sector from effectively engaging in the informal and 
formal sector, thus halting the programs from acting as a pro-poor education policy tool.  
 Germany provides a great model for VET programs. The dual system of learning 
in the classroom and also through apprenticeship programs is likely one of the reasons the 
youth unemployment rate is just 7.7 percent (Sirkin 2013). During training students also 
receive about one-third of the salary that a trained skilled worker would receive, making 
this educational track that much more appealing.  
While a general sense of bureaucratic neglect and societal stigma have led to a 
lack of investment in these programs, there is opportunity for reform that can positively 
impact the education sector as a whole. When controlling for GDP and unemployment, 
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training programs were found to be more effective in low and low-middle income 
countries than in rich countries (Fares and Puerto 2009). More specific to sub-Saharan 
Africa, some studies have found that the returns for vocational training are actually 
higher than general secondary schools for the majority of countries in the region 
(Bruneforth et al. 2011; Fares and Puerto 2009). VET has potential to increase 
employment for those who are barred from enrolling in general secondary education. 
Contextualized understanding of failed programs point to a few systematic elements of 
success that sub-Saharan African countries can work towards, ensuring relevance of 
curricula, high quality schooling, and feasible and affordable accessibility.  
Offering VET programs alongside formal secondary education could make it 
accessible for students early on, and also decrease the amount of time spent in a 
classroom. While it certainly does not make sense for a country to have universal 
enrollment in this alternative educational experience, it is a great opportunity to reform 
curriculum to be more practical.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 The focus on the right to education in the latter half of the 20th century established 
the expectation that all children in sub-Saharan Africa should have the chance to go to 
school and advance, at least, through secondary school. Today, over half of sub-Saharan 
African countries achieving at least 75 percent youth literacy rate and universal primary 
education enrollment appears just within reach (MDG Progress Report 2015).  
 In the two surprisingly successful cases covered by this thesis, compulsory 
education may well have succeeded in reinforcing the retention of students in schools. In 
Botswana and Ghana, education is compulsory for ten years and 11 years respectively 
(see Appendix: Table 30). If the challenges facing both of these countries’ education 
systems are counterbalanced by a longer duration of compulsory education, policymakers 
throughout the region should consider implementing this policy. 
 There is an emerging promise of “low-cost” private schools, aimed at teaching the 
very poorest communities. The performance and quality of these schools are matters of 
controversy, partially due to a lack of data on results. While there is a fond optimism that 
privatizing schools will be helpful, they are often undermined by rules and regulations 
and may not offer substantially better quality education. Rather, the demand for private 
schools reflects a choice of desperation on the part of parents, reflecting the reality that 
many sub-Saharan African countries are failing its students (Tooley and Dixon 2006).  
 Indeed, hidden within the surge in literacy rates and years spent in school stands 
the stark inequality in educational attainment that remains between sub-Saharan Africa 
and the rest of the world. Facilitating the creation of an effective school system in the 
region necessitates not only an open acknowledgment of the challenges facing a 
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particular country, but also a shift towards practical policy rather than mere political 
rhetoric. In comparing the relative performance in educational attainment between 
countries, this thesis has identified four main challenges that stymy educational success: 
1. Prolonged ethnic and racial tensions that lead to disadvantaged populations 
2. An acute shortage of adequate learning materials and trained teachers 
3. Inappropriate or insufficient curricula, creating a disjunction between labor supply 
and demand 
4. High out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs of education 
 Often, governments respond to their education crisis with policies that reflect 
ethnic bias—as in the case of Rwanda’s instruction in English policy—even if they are 
justified rhetorically by superficial arguments that enhance the educational experience. 
Another concern is responding to the education crisis by applying overly theoretical and 
complex curricula to a school structure that does not have the necessary foundation. The 
ultimate aim of any education curricula is to equip students with numeracy, literacy, and 
a wider skillset to realize the students’ potential. Recycling seemingly egalitarian learner-
methodologies and competency-based curricula, as was the case with South Africa’s 
C2005 initiative, will fail if not properly implemented. Bridging the gap between 
classroom realities and educational theories relies on attentively focusing on local 
contexts and cultures. South Africa failed to do this. Policy makers neglected to re-
educate those implementing the outcomes-based education—teachers who were products 
of the Bantu Education system themselves. An adequate curriculum sensitive to the 
particular cultures and capabilities within a country is integral in shaping an education 
system, as are those who are entrusted to teach it.  
 Moreover, if an education system is corrupt, as Ghana’s seems to be, the teacher 
quality will dwindle and the overall education system will fail its students. If, however, 
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teachers are somehow motivated to teach in rural and urban areas, there is more 
opportunity for improvement in educational attainment for all. While Education 
Ministries continue to build schools and execute publicity-attracting programs, such as 
Rwanda’s One Laptop per Child initiative, teachers have been severely underfunded and 
are often under-qualified. Multilateral aid organizations need to advocate teacher-training 
programs in their education policies, even if the positive impacts initially are less 
concrete. If not, the twin deficit of inadequate curricula and inadequate teachers will 
hamper any potential educational progress.  
 Perhaps the most glaring detriment in current political rhetoric is the concept of “fee 
free” education. While almost every sub-Saharan African country boasts some form of 
“fee free” school, the cost of education is not only real but also substantial. Ideally, these 
fees will be eliminated. If not, conditional cash transfer programs to promote schooling 
should be implemented across the region. 
 There is much to celebrate in Africa’s educational progress over the past half a 
century. Nevertheless, if the region hopes to capitalize on its abundant human potential, 
each country must address these challenges and offer meaningful policy solutions to 
improving them. Every child has the right to the social mobility that education can offer, 
and every country must shoulder the responsibility of providing it. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 25: Data Sources and Comments 
 Description Source Comments 
SE enrollment rates Figures report the 
distribution of 
educational 
attainment in the 
population over age 
15 by sex and by 5-
year age groups. 
Barro-Lee 
Educational 
Attainment Dataset 
Census/survey 
figures  as reported 
by national 
statistical authorities 
and UNESCO 
Rural population Rural population is 
the percent of people 
living in rural areas 
as defined by 
national statistical 
offices.  
The World Bank  Census/survey 
figures as reported 
by national 
statistical authorities 
Per capita income Per capita income is 
the mean income of 
the people in a 
country calculated 
by dividing the GDP 
by the total 
population. Figures 
converted to US 
dollars. 
The World Bank Census/survey 
figures as reported 
by national 
statistical authorities 
Rate of homicide The rate of homicide 
is the percent of 
unlawful homicides 
purposely inflicted 
as a result of 
conflict. 
UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime’s 
International 
Homicide Statistics 
database 
Census/survey 
figures as reported 
by national 
statistical authorities 
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Table 26: List of sub-Saharan African Countries in Barro-Lee Dataset 
 
Benin  Kenya Rwanda 
Botswana Lesotho Senegal 
Burundi Liberia Sierra Leone 
Cameroon Malawi South Africa 
Central African Republic Mali Sudan 
Congo Mauritania Swaziland 
Côte d´Ivoire Mauritius Togo 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Mozambique Uganda 
Gabon Namibia United Republic of Tanzania 
Gambia Niger Zambia 
Ghana Reunion Zimbabwe 
 
Table 27: Gender Disparity in Enrollment Rates 2012 
 Expected to never 
enroll (%) 
Enrolled but dropped 
out (%) 
Expected late 
enrollment (%) 
SSA total 50 15 36 
SSA 
Female 
56 11 34 
SSA Male 42 20 38 
World 
Total 
43 23 34 
World 
Female 
48 20 32 
World 
Male 
37 26 37 
Source: UNESCO 2012 (http://data.uis.unesco.org/) 
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Table 28: Average Teacher Remuneration of Primary and Secondary Education 
Teachers Financed Fully or in Part by the Government, as a ratio of GDP per 
capita, 2009 or most recent year 
 Primary 
Education 
Lower Secondary 
Education 
Upper Secondary 
Education 
Angola(2003) 1.5 … … 
Benin(2006) 3.6 6.0 8.2 
Burkina Faso(2006) 5.3 8.8 9.6 
Burundi(2007) 7.6 8.4 12.2 
Cameroon(2007) 3.2 5.2 5.5 
Cape Verde(2009) 2.5 3.0 3.2 
Central African Republic(2007) 3.3 6.9 7.1 
Chad(2003) 5.4 8.8 9.8 
Congo(2007) 0.9 2.0 2.5 
Côte d'Ivoire(2007) 4.9 8.8 9.4 
DR of the Congo(2005) 3.9 2.4 2.4 
Eritrea(2003) 7.7 … … 
Gambia(2003) 3.7 … … 
Ghana(2007) 4.7 4.7 4.8 
Guinea(2005) 1.7 2.9 2.9 
Guinea-Bissau(2006) 4.4 6.6 6.6 
Kenya(2004) 5.3 7.6 7.6 
Lesotho(2004) 5.0 10.4 10.4 
Liberia(2008) 3.0 3.1 3.3 
Madagascar(2006) 2.9 5.1 8.1 
Malawi(2008) 6.3 11.6 11.6 
Mali(2008) 4.2 5.6 6.6 
Mozambique(2003) 4.0 … … 
Niger(2008) 6.6 7.4 8.6 
Nigeria(2003) 4.9 … … 
Rwanda (2008) 2.6 6.4 7.3 
Sao Tome and Principe (2006) 2.3 … … 
Senegal (2004) 4.7 5.5 6.6 
Seychelles (2003) 1.7 … … 
Sierra Leone (2004) 4.2 5.9 5.9 
Sudan (2003) 2.2 … … 
Togo (2007) 6.1 8.9 11.6 
Uganda (2007) 4.7 … … 
Zambia (2003) 2.7 … … 
Zimbabwe (2003) 6.1 … … 
Average (35 countries) 4.1 6.3 7.2 
Minimum 0.9 2.0 2.4 
Maximum 7.7 11.6 12.2 
Source: UNESCO http://data.uis.unesco.org/ 
Note: “..” means the data is unavailable. 
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Table 29: World Wide Secondary Enrollment Rates 
 
 
Total Secondary 
enrollment 2012 
(000) 
Total Secondary 
enrollment change 
since 1999 (%) 
Lower Secondary 
Enrollment 1999 
(%) 
Lower Secondary 
Enrollment 2012 
(%) 
Upper Secondary 
Enrollment 1999 
Upper Secondary 
Enrollment 2012 
(%) 
World 551,686 27 71 91 45 62 
Low Income 
countries 
130,721 75 60 83 22 32 
High income 
countries 
79,768 -6 96 96 96 99 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
144075 75 59 79 20 32 
Arab States 42,761 22 80 89 45 58 
Central Asia 5,479 -20 95 96 82 104 
East Asia / 
Pacific 
184382 -18 95 96 43 73 
South and West 
Asia 
192,650 24 78 94 32 51 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
64,696 -8 93 94 63 76 
North America 
/ Western 
Europe 
51,349 -3 98 96 97 98 
Source: UNESCO 2012 (http://data.uis.unesco.org/) 
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Table 30: Duration of Compulsory Education (years) as of 2015 
Country Compulsory Education 
Angola 6 
Benin 6 
Botswana 10 
Burkina Faso 10 
Burundi 6 
Cameroon 6 
Cape Verde 10 
Central African Republic 7 
Chad 10 
Côte d'Ivoire 10 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 6 
Eritrea 8 
Ethiopia 8 
Gabon 10 
Gambia 9 
Ghana 11 
Guinea 6 
Guinea-Bissau 9 
Kenya 12 
Lesotho 7 
Liberia 6 
Libya 9 
Malawi 0 
Mali 9 
Mozambique 6 
Namibia 7 
Rwanda 6 
Sao Tome and Principe 6 
Senegal 11 
Seychelles 10 
Sierra Leone 9 
Somalia 8 
South Africa 9 
Sudan (pre-secession) 7 
Swaziland 7 
Togo 10 
Uganda 7 
United Republic of Tanzania 7 
Zambia 7 
Zimbabwe 7 
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Source: UNESCO (http://data.uis.unesco.org/) 
Table 31: Lower Income Countries (GNI per capita of $1,045 or less) 
Afghanistan Gambia, The Niger 
Benin Guinea Rwanda 
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bisau Sierra Leone 
Burundi Haiti Somalia  
Cambodia Korea, Dem Rep. South Sudan  
Central African Republic Liberia Tanzania 
Chad Madagascar Togo 
Comoros Malawi Uganda 
Congo, Dem. Rep Mali Zimbabwe 
Eritrea Mozambique   
Ethiopia Nepal  
Source: The World Bank 2015 Income Classifications (http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-
country-classifications-2015) 
 
Table 32: Lower-Middle Income Economies (GNI per capita of $1,046-$4,125) 
Armenia Indonesia Samoa 
Bangladesh Kenya São Tomé and Principe 
Bhutan Kiribati Senegal 
Bolivia Kosovo   Solomon Islands 
Cabo Verde Kyrgyz Republic Sri Lanka 
Cameroon Lao PDR Sudan 
Congo, Rep. Lesotho Swaziland 
Côte d'Ivoire Mauritania Syrian Arab Republic 
Djibouti Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Tajikistan 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Moldova Timor-Leste 
El Salvador Morocco Ukraine 
Georgia Myanmar Uzbekistan 
Ghana Nicaragua Vanuatu 
Guatemala Nigeria   Vietnam 
Guyana Pakistan   West Bank and Gaza 
Honduras Papua New Guinea   Yemen, Rep.  
India Philippines Zambia 
 
Source: The World Bank 2015 Income Classifications (http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-
country-classifications-2015) 
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Table 33 Global Transition Rates from Primary to Secondary School 
Country Effective transition rate 
from primary to secondary 
(2008-2009) 
Net enrollment ratio, 
primary (latest year 
available) 
Algeria 96 96.05 
Anguilla 92 92.74 
Antigua and Barbuda 94 89.18 
Argentina 100 104.45 
Armenia 99 87.06 
Aruba 99 94.54 
Austria 100   
Azerbaijan 99 85.17 
Bahamas 100 101.28 
Bahrain 100 93.19 
Barbados 99 104.46 
Belarus 100 95.69 
Belgium 99 99.87 
Belize 96 100.99 
Bhutan 98 87.84 
Bolivia 96 88.23 
Botswana 98 85.60 
British Virgin Islands 93 93.47 
Bulgaria 98 98.15 
Burkina Faso 75 60.42 
Burundi 70 101.19 
Cambodia 81 95.96 
Cameroon 51 94.21 
Cape Verde 93 92.89 
Cayman Islands 97 81.55 
Central African Republic 59 68.06 
Chad 83 62.29 
Chile 93 93.57 
China, Hong Kong 
Special Administrative 
Region 
100 92.10 
China, Macao Special 
Administrative Region 
99 84.59 
Colombia 100 89.73 
Congo 71 56.73 
Côte d'Ivoire 69 61.48 
Croatia 99 87.49 
Cuba 99 100.18 
Cyprus 100 102.73 
Czech Republic 100 95.94 
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Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
89 33.07 
Denmark 100 95.54 
Djibouti 89 44.49 
Dominica 92 95.22 
Dominican Republic 95 83.28 
Ecuador 79 100.36 
El Salvador 95 92.96 
Eritrea 92 35.81 
Estonia 99 95.20 
Ethiopia 91 82.50 
Fiji 100 96.67 
Finland 100 97.48 
Gambia 83 72.02 
Georgia 99 103.49 
Germany 100 99.21 
Ghana 96 76.69 
Greece 97 98.29 
Grenada 88 95.14 
Guatemala 93 95.44 
Guinea 59 74.64 
Guyana 94 78.46 
Hungary 100 92.37 
Iceland 100 99.36 
India 85 92.08 
Indonesia 92 101.06 
Iran 97 100.64 
Italy 100 100.09 
Jordan 100 89.67 
Kazakhstan 100 93.49 
Kuwait 100 96.89 
Kyrgyzstan 100 86.26 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic 
82 88.98 
Latvia 99 93.66 
Lebanon 95 88.76 
Lesotho 85 71.92 
Liberia 66 74.07 
Liechtenstein 99 90.35 
Lithuania 99 93.35 
Madagascar 73 101.51 
Malawi 84 100.44 
Malaysia 99 94.97 
Maldives 96 97.80 
Mali 86 61.13 
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Malta 100 88.87 
Mauritania 61 73.41 
Mauritius 85 93.24 
Mexico 95 104.81 
Mongolia 97 88.87 
Montserrat 99 97.42 
Morocco 87 90.00 
Mozambique 62 90.37 
Myanmar 74   
Namibia 94 85.41 
Nepal 88 71.13 
Nicaragua 97 92.78 
Niger 72 53.64 
Nigeria 44   
Norway 100 98.98 
Occupied Palestinian 
Territory 
97 85.55 
Pakistan 74 71.61 
Panama 98 96.62 
Paraguay 90 85.08 
Peru 96 94.52 
Philippines 99 95.36 
Poland 99 95.89 
Qatar 100 98.22 
Republic of Korea 100 101.64 
Republic of Moldova 98 87.52 
Romania 99 87.21 
Russian Federation 100 93.37 
Rwanda  Unavailable 100.09 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 97 89.30 
Saint Lucia 98 89.78 
San Marino 97 92.00 
Sao Tome and Principe 73 99.80 
Saudi Arabia 99 89.87 
Senegal 72 75.75 
Serbia 99 94.22 
Seychelles 98 103.31 
Singapore 91   
Slovakia 99   
Slovenia 99 96.77 
South Africa 95 85.10 
Spain 100 103.49 
Sri Lanka 97 93.59 
Sudan 95   
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Suriname 68 90.91 
Swaziland 84 81.85 
Sweden 100 99.71 
Switzerland 100 93.61 
Syrian Arab Republic 98 96.70 
Tajikistan 99 101.12 
Togo 78 94.25 
Tonga   104.21 
Trinidad and Tobago 94 93.00 
Tunisia 94 100.65 
Uganda 63 94.09 
Ukraine 100 89.41 
United Arab Emirates 100 81.42 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
36 97.19 
Uruguay 88 98.96 
Uzbekistan 99 88.68 
Vanuatu 85 100.15 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
98 92.17 
Zambia 75 93.04 
Note: Net enrollment ratio is defined as the enrollment of the official age group for a 
given level of education expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population. 
Source: UNESCO (http://data.uis.unesco.org/)  
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Table 34: Ethnic Fractionalization and Cultural Diversity 
Country Ethnic Fraction Cultural Fract Rank of Fract 
Tanzania 0.953 0.564 14 
Democratic Republic 
Congo 
0.933 0.628 7 
Uganda 0.930 0.647 5 
Liberia 0.899 0.644 6 
Cameroon 0.887 0.733 1 
Togo 0.883 0.602 8 
South Africa 0.880 0.530 20 
Congo 0.878 0.562 15 
Madagascar 0.861 0.192 36 
Gabon 0.857 0.382 29 
Kenya 0.852 0.601 9 
Ghana 0.846 0.388 28 
Malawi 0.829 0.294 31 
Guinea Bissau 0.818 0.568 13 
Somalia 0.812 0.290 32 
Nigeria 0.805 0.660 4 
Central African Republic 0.791 0.511 21 
Ivory Coast 0.784 0.557 17 
Chad 0.772 0.727 2 
Mozambique 0.765 0.285 33 
Gambia 0.764 0.548 18 
Sierra Leone 0.764 0.534 19 
Ethiopia 0.760 0.562 16 
Angola 0.756 0.242 35 
Mali 0.754 0.590 11 
Senegal 0.727 0.402 25 
Zambia 0.726 0.189 37 
Namibia 0.724 0.589 12 
Sudan 0.708 0.698 3 
Burkina Faso 0.704 0.354 30 
Guinea 0.669 0.490 22 
Eritrea 0.647 0.398 27 
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Niger 0.637 0.600 10 
Mauritius 0.632 0.448 23 
Mauritania 0.625 0.272 34 
Benin 0.622 0.400 26 
Djibouti 0.606 0.404 24 
Zimbabwe 0.366 0.141 40 
Botswana 0.351 0.161 38 
Burundi 0.328 0.040 42 
Swaziland 0.280 0.143 39 
Lesotho 0.255 0.057 41 
Rwanda 0.180 0.000 43 
Source: Fearon 2008, 216-219 
 
	  	  
140	  
140	  
Figure 4: Rre Boammaruri 
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Table 35: Prediction Model Output Residuals 
Country Year Actual 
Years 
Secondary 
School 
Predicted 
Years 
Secondary 
School 
(Africa) 
Predicted 
Years 
Secondary 
School 
(World) 
Residual 
Africa 
Residual 
World 
Benin 1960 0.14 0.0738237 -0.0584923 0.066176 0.198492 
Benin 1965 0.16 0.1467727 0.0703525 0.013227 0.089648 
Benin 1970 0.18 0.2680724 0.2355053 -0.088072 -0.055505 
Benin 1975 0.21 0.4032279 0.4446177 -0.193227 -0.234618 
Benin 1980 0.33 0.6011277 0.6649725 -0.271127 -0.334973 
Benin 1985 0.53 0.7916517 0.7974594 -0.261651 -0.267460 
Benin 1990 0.68 0.9652773 0.9480453 -0.28527 -0.268045 
Benin 1995 0.85 1.101082 1.037014 -0.251082 -0.187014 
Benin 2000 1.08 1.186477 1.098579 -0.106477 -0.018579 
Benin 2005 1.36 1.280559 1.169909 0.079441 0.190091 
Benin 2010 1.7 1.377013 1.248929 0.322987 0.451071 
       
Botswana 1960 0.09 -0.0682058 -0.3054091 0.158206 0.395409 
Botswana 1965 0.1 -0.0495106 -0.2740033 0.149511 0.374003 
Botswana 1970 0.2 0.0755275 -0.1140347 0.124473 0.314035 
Botswana 1975 0.25 0.2116945 0.0554232 0.038306 0.194577 
Botswana 1980 0.34 0.4526228 0.2571788 -0.11262 0.082821 
Botswana 1985 1.26 0.7947283 0.6585063 0.465272 0.601494 
Botswana 1990 2.15 1.443764 1.31714 0.706236 0.83286 
Botswana 1995 2.62 1.722862 1.603929 0.897138 1.016071 
Botswana 2000 2.87 1.914432 1.782053 0.955568 1.087947 
Botswana 2005 3.05 2.253125 1.918491 0.796875 1.131509 
Botswana 2010 3.19 2.434991 1.993433 0.755009 1.196567 
       
Burundi 1960 0.04 -0.0882934 -0.3438984 0.128293 0.383898 
Burundi 1965 0.05 -0.0870199 -0.3359075 0.137020 0.385908 
Burundi 1970 0.07 -0.0438915 -0.3135271 0.113891 0.383527 
Burundi 1975 0.1 -0.0153794 -0.2852315 0.115379 0.385232 
Burundi 1980 0.12 0.0721058 -0.2496078 0.047894 0.369608 
Burundi 1985 0.14 0.2259762 -0.2141545 -0.085976 0.354155 
Burundi 1990 0.17 0.316332 -0.1738655 -0.146332 0.343866 
Burundi 1995 0.23 0.421086 -0.1379956 -0.191086 0.367996 
Burundi 2000 0.3 0.4933841 -0.0980635 -0.193384 0.398064 
Burundi 2005 0.4 0.5518588 -0.0530251 -0.151859 0.453025 
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Burundi 2010 0.53 0.6237279 -0.0006308 -0.093739 0.530631 
       
Cameroon 1960 0.17 0.1798482 0.1266027 -0.009848 0.043397 
Cameroon 1965 0.25 0.2466045 0.243652 0.003396 0.006348 
Cameroon 1970 0.32 0.3553804 0.3800352 -0.035380 -0.060035 
Cameroon 1975 0.47 0.5420657 0.6624078 -0.072066 -0.192408 
Cameroon 1980 0.64 0.752601 0.8581139 -0.112601 -0.218114 
Cameroon 1985 0.83 0.9838937 1.029575 -0.153894 -0.199575 
Cameroon 1990 1.04 1.150484 1.169435 -0.110484 -0.129435 
Cameroon 1995 1.24 1.264853 1.275371 -0.024853 -0.035371 
Cameroon 2000 1.42 1.378278 1.39141 0.041722 0.02859 
Cameroon 2005 1.58 1.520703 1.520528 0.059297 0.059472 
Cameroon 2010 1.82 1.651498 1.645537 0.168502 0.174463 
       
Gabon 1960 0.24 0.2787312 0.2688041 -0.038731 -0.028804 
Gabon 1965 0.34 0.4375562 0.5255104 -0.097556 -0.185510 
Gabon 1970 0.43 0.6642695 0.8547223 -0.234270 -0.424722 
Gabon 1975 0.72 1.283746 1.376342 -0.563746 -0.656342 
Gabon 1980 1.03 1.937239 1.920153 -0.907239 -0.890153 
Gabon 1985 1.42 1.993895 2.167092 -0.573895 -0.747092 
Gabon 1990 1.77 2.512038 2.504168 -0.742038 -0.734168 
Gabon 1995 2.14 2.514166 2.696623 -0.374166 -0.556623 
Gabon 2000 2.42 2.612361 2.869249 -0.192361 -0.449249 
Gabon 2005 2.77 3.084561 3.088326 -0.314561 -0.318326 
Gabon 2010 3.15 3.505172 3.258165 -0.355172 -0.108165 
       
Ghana 1960 0.14 0.3947378 0.4971588 -0.25474 -0.35716 
Ghana 1965 0.78 0.4670309 0.6111318 0.312969 0.168868 
Ghana 1970 1.54 0.5582464 0.725199 0.981754 0.814801 
Ghana 1975 1.86 0.5936986 0.7692413 1.266301 1.090759 
Ghana 1980 2.17 0.69012 0.8172777 1.47988 1.352722 
Ghana 1985 2.41 0.8527666 0.8840069 1.557233 1.525993 
Ghana 1990 2.52 1.009935 1.025746 1.510065 1.494254 
Ghana 1995 2.52 1.178925 1.17151 1.341075 1.34849 
Ghana 2000 2.76 1.300197 1.317541 1.459803 1.442459 
Ghana 2005 2.81 1.438367 1.458683 1.371633 1.351317 
Ghana 2010 2.95 1.657185 1.619342 1.292815 1.330658 
       
Kenya 1960 0.11 0.0321544 -0.134008 0.077845 0.244008 
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Kenya 1965 0.15 0.0595787 -0.0846127 0.090421 0.234613 
Kenya 1970 0.23 0.1304043 -0.016585 0.099596 0.246585 
Kenya 1975 0.36 0.2090895 0.0901373 0.150911 0.269863 
Kenya 1980 0.53 0.3504391 0.2021825 0.179561 0.327818 
Kenya 1985 0.65 0.4754494 0.2175426 0.174551 0.432457 
Kenya 1990 0.79 0.5697445 0.2456972 0.220256 0.544303 
Kenya 1995 0.89 0.6880342 0.3045054 0.201966 0.585495 
Kenya 2000 1.01 0.788148 0.3714175 0.221852 0.638583 
Kenya 2005 1.16 0.8755926 0.4457687 0.284407 0.714232 
Kenya 2010 1.26 1.013138 0.535367 0.246862 0.724633 
       
Lesotho 1960 0.06 -0.0605367 -0.2880831 0.120537 0.348083 
Lesotho 1965 0.06 0.0039362 -0.174629 0.056064 0.234629 
Lesotho 1970 0.15 0.0830025 -0.085709 0.066998 0.235709 
Lesotho 1975 0.27 0.1479895 0.0038679 0.122011 0.266132 
Lesotho 1980 0.37 0.2435631 0.0350316 0.126437 0.334968 
Lesotho 1985 0.44 0.3607145 0.041871 0.079286 0.398129 
Lesotho 1990 0.54 0.5049825 0.1349235 0.035018 0.405077 
Lesotho 1995 0.68 0.6803597 0.2578144 -0.00036 0.422186 
Lesotho 2000 0.83 0.7814133 0.3580181 0.048587 0.471982 
Lesotho 2005 0.99 0.9123241 0.4741796 0.077676 0.515820 
Lesotho 2010 1.16 1.052069 0.5851567 0.107931 0.574843 
       
Liberia 1960 0.13 0.2908994 0.3140236 -0.16090 -0.1840 
Liberia 1965 0.23 0.36842 0.4519122 -0.13842 -0.22191 
Liberia 1970 0.35 0.489414 0.6082448 -0.13941 -0.25825 
Liberia 1975 0.55 0.6102253 0.7845881 -0.06023 -0.23459 
Liberia 1980 0.7 0.7839626 0.9769089 -0.08396 -0.27691 
Liberia 1985 0.82 1.066653 1.259882 -0.24665 -0.43988 
Liberia 1990 0.88 1.400172 1.76951 -0.52017 -0.88951 
Liberia 1995 0.9 1.264803 1.391545 -0.36480 -0.49155 
Liberia 2000 1.04 1.298188 1.330854 -0.25819 -0.29085 
Liberia 2005 1.31 1.365813 1.398338 -0.05581 -0.08834 
Liberia 2010 1.61 1.46003 1.472641 0.14997 0.137359 
       
Malawi 1960 0.03 -0.0405418 -0.2532175 0.070542 0.283218 
Malawi 1965 0.04 -0.0285915 -0.2323662 0.068592 0.272366 
Malawi 1970 0.1 0.0260661 -0.1868723 0.073934 0.286872 
Malawi 1975 0.16 0.076019 -0.1219613 0.083981 0.281961 
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Malawi 1980 0.21 0.1732901 -0.0639808 0.036710 0.273981 
Malawi 1985 0.19 0.3240312 -0.0213465 -0.134032 0.211347 
Malawi 1990 0.24 0.4329924 0.0352629 -0.192992 0.204737 
Malawi 1995 0.27 0.5524403 0.1007952 -0.28244 0.169205 
Malawi 2000 0.35 0.6376593 0.1544976 -0.287660 0.195502 
Malawi 2005 0.49 0.6874131 0.1739676 -0.197413 0.316032 
Malawi 2010 0.62 0.7521681 0.1979163 -0.132168 0.422084 
       
Mali 1970 0.03 0.2086577 0.1404085 -0.17866 -0.11041 
Mali 1975 0.06 0.267562 0.2182504 -0.20756 -0.15825 
Mali 1980 0.1 0.3886374 0.3107659 -0.28864 -0.21077 
Mali 1985 0.13 0.5652722 0.4081216 -0.43527 -0.27812 
Mali 1990 0.15 0.7043624 0.5031691 -0.55436 -0.35317 
Mali 1995 0.18 0.8384585 0.589125 -0.65846 -0.40913 
Mali 2000 0.27 0.9499451 0.7001761 -0.67995 -0.43018 
Mali 2005 0.4 1.089372 0.8527656 -0.68937 -0.45277 
Mali 2010 0.6 1.238371 1.015063 -0.63837 -0.41506 
       
Mauritania 1960 0.07 0.0228727 -0.152746 0.047127 0.222746 
Mauritania 1965 0.09 0.1016095 -0.0236933 -0.01161 0.113693 
Mauritania 1970 0.12 0.2300526 0.1535152 -0.11005 -0.03352 
Mauritania 1975 0.17 0.3938093 0.3965865 -0.22381 -0.22659 
Mauritania 1980 0.29 0.6130602 0.6689034 -0.32306 -0.37890 
Mauritania 1985 0.36 0.9034621 0.9680117 -0.54346 -0.60801 
Mauritania 1990 0.45 1.131376 1.222116 -0.68137 -0.77212 
Mauritania 1995 0.55 1.321369 1.380757 -0.77137 -0.83076 
Mauritania 2000 0.66 1.445978 1.534475 -0.78598 -0.87448 
Mauritania 2005 0.76 1.592413 1.694869 -0.83241 -0.93487 
Mauritania 2010 0.87 1.773753 1.851775 -0.90375 -0.98178 
       
Mauritius 1980 1.78 1.039343 1.283978 0.740657 0.496022 
Mauritius 1985 2.05 1.155077 1.279229 0.894923 0.770771 
Mauritius 1990 2.48 1.455121 1.387312 1.024879 1.092688 
Mauritius 1995 2.48 1.676694 1.397541 0.803306 1.082459 
Mauritius 2000 2.27 1.751617 1.381529 0.518383 0.888471 
Mauritius 2005 2.63 1.92757 1.379747 0.70243 1.250253 
Mauritius 2010 2.94 2.292588 1.422569 0.647412 1.517431 
       
Mozambique 1980 0.06 0.2760973 0.10042 -0.216097 -0.04042 
	  	  
145	  
145	  
Mozambique 1985 0.07 0.5288715 0.3073058 -0.458872 -0.237306 
Mozambique 1990 0.08 0.7284467 0.5664485 -0.648447 -0.486449 
Mozambique 1995 0.08 0.8668593 0.6636517 -0.786859 -0.583652 
Mozambique 2000 0.11 0.9685693 0.7300509 -0.858569 -0.620051 
Mozambique 2005 0.16 1.03043 0.7680721 -0.87043 -0.60807 
Mozambique 2010 0.28 1.099613 0.8091947 -0.819613 -0.529195 
       
Namibia 1980 1.13 0.8208916 0.6391776 0.309108 0.490822 
Namibia 1985 1.36 0.8485684 0.6590084 0.511432 0.700992 
Namibia 1990 1.53 1.026137 0.7282363 0.503863 0.801764 
Namibia 1995 1.39 1.216875 0.8262684 0.173125 0.563732 
Namibia 2000 1.2 1.283943 0.9172712 -0.083943 0.282729 
Namibia 2005 1.26 1.612908 1.1339 -0.352908 0.1261 
Namibia 2010 1.39 1.96463 1.380278 -0.57463 0.009722 
       
Niger 1960 0.03 0.0021103 -0.1949632 0.027890 0.224963 
Niger 1965 0.04 0.0287737 -0.1535356 0.011226 0.193536 
Niger 1970 0.04 0.0974969 -0.0758874 -0.057497 0.115887 
Niger 1975 0.07 0.1708654 0.0297783 -0.100865 0.040222 
Niger 1980 0.1 0.299684 0.1167228 -0.199684 -0.016723 
Niger 1985 0.15 0.4278358 0.1533079 -0.277836 -0.003308 
Niger 1990 0.2 0.5323029 0.1894688 -0.332303 0.010531 
Niger 1995 0.25 0.6157309 0.2019235 -0.365731 0.048077 
Niger 2000 0.28 0.6730862 0.2169708 -0.393086 0.063029 
Niger 2005 0.32 0.7290851 0.241011 -0.409085 0.078989 
Niger 2010 0.4 0.7948592 0.2773107 -0.394859 0.122689 
       
Rwanda 1960 0.07 -0.0807005 -0.3241552 0.150701 0.394155 
Rwanda 1965 0.09 -0.0747714 -0.3128289 0.164771 0.402829 
Rwanda 1970 0.11 -0.0377294 -0.3000923 0.1477294 0.4100923 
Rwanda 1975 0.13 -0.0027002 -0.2659957 0.132700 0.395996 
Rwanda 1980 0.16 0.0833741 -0.2338285 0.076626 0.393829 
Rwanda 1985 0.19 0.2276222 -0.2193895 -0.037622 0.409390 
Rwanda 1990 0.25 0.3173686 -0.2029489 -0.06737 0.452949 
Rwanda 1995 0.31 0.4869121 -0.0322862 -0.17691 0.342286 
Rwanda 2000 0.36 0.6527074 0.1689103 -0.29271 0.191090 
Rwanda 2005 0.41 0.7902507 0.3434183 -0.38025 0.066582 
Rwanda 2010 0.46 0.9631575 0.5365704 -0.50316 -0.07657 
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Senegal 1960 0.12 0.3980329 0.4892967 -0.278033 -0.369297 
Senegal 1965 0.17 0.4727212 0.6222249 -0.302721 -0.452225 
Senegal 1970 0.25 0.5793236 0.7659475 -0.329326 -0.515948 
Senegal 1975 0.32 0.6969472 0.9187564 -0.376947 -0.598756 
Senegal 1980 0.42 0.8209196 1.006334 -0.400920 -0.586334 
Senegal 1985 0.51 0.9697201 1.071388 -0.459720 -0.561388 
Senegal 1990 0.61 1.112017 1.134334 -0.502017 -0.524334 
Senegal 1995 0.71 1.190672 1.156461 -0.480672 -0.446461 
Senegal 2000 0.79 1.248951 1.18243 -0.458951 -0.39243 
Senegal 2005 0.93 1.337677 1.222474 -0.407677 -0.292474 
Senegal 2010 1.14 1.426383 1.273548 -0.286383 -0.133548 
       
Sierra Leone 1960 0.14 0.2596165 0.2626877 -0.119617 -0.122688 
Sierra Leone 1965 0.17 0.3263489 0.3826128 -0.156349 -0.212613 
Sierra Leone 1970 0.22 0.4366706 0.5251945 -0.216671 -0.305195 
Sierra Leone 1975 0.29 0.5370619 0.6762103 -0.247062 -0.386210 
Sierra Leone 1980 0.36 0.6530991 0.7623842 -0.293099 -0.402384 
Sierra Leone 1985 0.46 0.8186383 0.8450652 -0.358638 -0.385065 
Sierra Leone 1990 0.55 0.907823 0.8921082 -0.357823 -0.342108 
Sierra Leone 1995 0.61 1.031538 0.9406099 -0.421538 -0.33061 
Sierra Leone 2000 0.73 1.102275 0.9857283 -0.372275 -0.255728 
Sierra Leone 2005 0.95 1.182914 1.038945 -0.232914 -0.088945 
Sierra Leone 2010 1.13 1.264687 1.098322 -0.134687 0.031678 
       
South Africa 1960 0.91 0.9432255 1.42895 -0.033226 -0.51895 
South Africa 1965 0.97 0.9736223 1.457989 -0.003622 -0.487989 
South Africa 1970 1.02 1.048607 1.488275 -0.028607 -0.468275 
South Africa 1975 0.99 1.153892 1.521763 -0.163892 -0.531763 
South Africa 1980 1 1.406052 1.579401 -0.406052 -0.579401 
South Africa 1985 0.93 1.45518 1.592216 -0.52518 -0.662216 
South Africa 1990 1.45 1.725059 1.730528 -0.275059 -0.280528 
South Africa 1995 2.18 1.974175 1.852436 0.205825 0.327564 
South Africa 2000 2.17 1.964404 1.919879 0.205596 0.250121 
South Africa 2005 2.38 2.367249 2.098683 0.012751 0.281317 
South Africa 2010 2.44 2.719939 2.266324 -0.279939 0.173676 
       
Sudan 1960 0.1 0.1082593 0.0001439 -0.00826 0.099856 
Sudan 1965 0.12 0.1670361 0.1044587 -0.04704 0.015541 
Sudan 1970 0.14 0.2692336 0.230018 -0.12924 -0.09002 
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Sudan 1975 0.23 0.3498302 0.3303675 -0.11983 -0.10037 
Sudan 1980 0.29 0.4407364 0.3737328 -0.15074 -0.08373 
Sudan 1985 0.38 0.6590981 0.4963976 -0.27910 -0.11640 
Sudan 1990 0.49 0.8473659 0.7185178 -0.35737 -0.22852 
Sudan 1995 0.56 1.013883 0.8610536 -0.45388 -0.30105 
Sudan 2000 0.59 1.059178 0.8680924 -0.46918 -0.27809 
Sudan 2005 0.61 1.138129 0.8883541 -0.52813 -0.27835 
Sudan 2010 0.67 1.280569 0.9250525 -0.61057 -0.25505 
       
Swaziland 1960 0.22 -0.0437015 -0.2703303 0.263702 0.490330 
Swaziland 1965 0.25 0.0228411 -0.1657496 0.227159 0.415750 
Swaziland 1970 0.43 0.131892 -0.0364707 0.298108 0.466471 
Swaziland 1975 0.68 0.2752722 0.1432411 0.404728 0.536759 
Swaziland 1980 0.9 0.4606477 0.305977 0.439352 0.594023 
Swaziland 1985 1.13 0.6285945 0.4502897 0.501406 0.679710 
Swaziland 1990 1.34 0.8293537 0.5186431 0.510646 0.821357 
Swaziland 1995 1.56 0.9847541 0.5390949 0.575246 1.020905 
Swaziland 2000 1.74 0.9863864 0.5143273 0.753614 1.225673 
Swaziland 2005 1.88 1.12471 0.5173665 0.75529 1.362634 
Swaziland 2010 2.05 1.229021 0.5153054 0.820979 1.534695 
       
Togo 1960 0.04 0.0898306 -0.0264602 -0.04983 0.066460 
Togo 1965 0.05 0.2004354 0.1664848 -0.15044 -0.11649 
Togo 1970 0.09 0.3702091 0.4171731 -0.28021 -0.32717 
Togo 1975 0.48 0.4323235 0.4866182 0.047677 -0.00662 
Togo 1980 0.88 0.5472736 0.5603905 0.332726 0.319610 
Togo 1985 1.07 0.6967965 0.629698 0.373204 0.440302 
Togo 1990 1.21 0.8400407 0.7160582 0.369960 0.493942 
Togo 1995 1.33 0.9597204 0.795813 0.370280 0.534187 
Togo 2000 1.46 1.056691 0.8816348 0.403309 0.578365 
Togo 2005 1.71 1.154088 0.9753287 0.555912 0.734671 
Togo 2010 2.04 1.25572 1.071906 0.78428 0.968094 
       
Uganda 1960 0.12 -0.0376421 -0.2516028 0.157642 0.371603 
Uganda 1965 0.1 -0.0081284 -0.2068913 0.108128 0.306891 
Uganda 1970 0.1 0.0489379 -0.1604826 0.051062 0.260483 
Uganda 1975 0.13 0.076095 -0.1429369 0.053905 0.272937 
Uganda 1980 0.2 0.1262402 -0.1271557 0.073760 0.327156 
Uganda 1985 0.31 0.3128196 -0.0586892 -0.00282 0.368689 
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Uganda 1990 0.45 0.4286526 0.0176296 0.021347 0.432370 
Uganda 1995 0.5 0.535693 0.0419336 -0.035693 0.458066 
Uganda 2000 0.52 0.5957658 0.0578321 -0.07577 0.462168 
Uganda 2005 0.61 0.6567348 0.097288 -0.046735 0.512712 
Uganda 2010 0.74 0.7558869 0.1628491 -0.015887 0.577151 
       
Zambia 1960 0.04 0.2880093 0.2966314 -0.24801 -0.25663 
Zambia 1965 0.05 0.411701 0.5055476 -0.36170 -0.45555 
Zambia 1970 0.09 0.6116552 0.7856641 -0.52166 -0.69566 
Zambia 1975 0.25 0.7289032 0.9689139 -0.47890 -0.71891 
Zambia 1980 0.45 0.9138122 1.16718 -0.46381 -0.71718 
Zambia 1985 0.64 0.9977283 1.150281 -0.35773 -0.51028 
Zambia 1990 0.84 1.075655 1.143093 -0.23566 -0.30309 
Zambia 1995 0.94 1.115251 1.052247 -0.17525 -0.11225 
Zambia 2000 0.95 1.108524 0.9589461 -0.1585 -0.00895 
Zambia 2005 0.97 1.227289 1.041659 -0.25729 -0.07166 
Zambia 2010 1.03 1.409948 1.149413 -0.37995 -0.11941 
       
Zimbabwe 1960 0.41 0.1724901 0.0792666 0.23751 0.330733 
Zimbabwe 1965 0.45 0.2180535 0.1593478 0.231947 0.290652 
Zimbabwe 1970 0.55 0.315841 0.2698641 0.234159 0.2801359 
Zimbabwe 1975 0.66 0.4251013 0.3801408 0.234899 0.279859 
Zimbabwe 1980 0.95 0.5630599 0.4855151 0.386940 0.464485 
Zimbabwe 1985 1.36 0.7249555 0.5970033 0.635045 0.762997 
Zimbabwe 1990 2.01 0.9031972 0.7447401 1.106803 1.265260 
Zimbabwe 1995 2.27 1.022804 0.8460201 1.247196 1.423980 
Zimbabwe 2000 2.17 1.11144 0.9238257 1.05856 1.246174 
Zimbabwe 2005 2.17 1.138864 0.9348382 1.031136 1.235162 
Zimbabwe 2010 2.01 1.183884 0.9060764 0.826116 1.103924 
 	  
